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What we have accomplished has helped to establish the principle 
of accountability for violations of human rights and will act as a 
catalyst to expand and legitimize the task of inquiring into 
historical wrongs. In this I take pride.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 16, 2006, an arbitration panel ruled that Austria was 
legally obligated to return six paintings, including the famous 
“Woman in Gold,” to Maria Altmann, a then ninety-year-old woman.2 
Mrs. Altmann’s story has captured the world’s attention and 
imagination, as evidenced by the recent film, Woman in Gold, starring 
Helen Mirren.3 Altmann had been struggling for the return of her 
                                                                                                             
1. STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 357 (2004) (discussing his feelings concerning the 
success of the Holocaust restitution process). 
2. See Michael McNay, Maria Altmann Obituary, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:19 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2011/feb/11/maria-altmann-obituary?INTCM 
P=SRCH (providing an obituary after Mrs. Altmann’s death and detailing her life 
experiences); see generally William Grimes, Maria Altmann, Pursuer of Family Stolen 
Paintings, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/arts/ 
design/09altmann.html?_r=0 (discussing Mrs. Altmann’s life and memorializing her death). 
3. See THE WOMAN IN GOLD (Origin Pictures 2015) (dramatizing Mrs. Altmann’s story 
for a motion picture production); see generally ANNE-MARIE O’CONNOR, THE LADY IN 
GOLD: THE EXTRAORDINARY TALE OF GUSTAV KLIMT’S MASTERPIECE, PORTRAIT OF ADELE 
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family’s assets seized by the Austrian government and Nazi officials 
after the Anschluss since the end of World War II.4 After the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, formerly closed archives were opened, 
giving historians and researchers access to previously unavailable 
documents.5 The access to new resources, coupled with the surge of 
Holocaust memory in the United States, created the perfect storm.6 
Survivors like Altmann, with access to these newly available 
documents, pushed once more for the repatriation of their property, 
art, and bank accounts.7 In 2000, Altmann, having faced adversity in 
the Austrian courts, filed in the US District Court for the Central 
District of California under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.8 
The Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that Austria was not immune from 
                                                                                                             
BLOCH-BAUER (providing a historical overview of Vienna leading up to the commission of the 
painting, through the creation of the portrait until its reunion with Mrs. Altmann). 
4. The Anschluss was the German annexation of Austria during World War II. See 
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) aff’d and remanded, 
317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 
2003) aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (providing the procedure and progression 
of the Altmann case as it passed through federal district court and eventually made it up to the 
Supreme Court to rule on the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act); see also David 
Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, A Picasso & A Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to Recover Nazi 
Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 39, 44-62 (2004) (analyzing three different 
looted art cases and the ways in which they progressed in US courts). 
5. See Avi Beker, Introduction to THE PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE 
HOLOCAUST 4, 1-32 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (providing a brief history and understanding of 
European mythmaking in explanation of the difficulty European countries had with facing 
their Holocaust-era history and memory); see generally MICHAEL MARRUS, SOME MEASURE 
OF JUSTICE: THE HOLOCAUST ERA RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (2009) (analyzing 
the rise of Holocaust litigation and memory in the 1990s through the vast media attention and 
new resources available after the conclusion of the Cold War). 
6. See Beker, supra note 5; see generally PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN 
AMERICAN Life (1999) (explaining the history of American memory and understanding of the 
Holocaust from the immediate postwar period through the 1990s). 
7. See generally In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1206 (2006) (affirming the role of the Special Master and approving the 
Special Master’s funds allocation plan); see generally Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001) aff’d and remanded, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) opinion amended on denial of 
reh’g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003) aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (providing 
the procedure and progression of the Altmann case as it passed through federal district court 
and eventually made it up to the Supreme Court to rule on the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity 
Act). 
8. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) aff’d and remanded, 317 F3d 954 
(9th Cir. 2002) opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003) aff’d on 
other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (providing the procedure and progression of the Altmann 
case as it passed through federal district court and eventually made it up to the Supreme Court 
to rule on the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act); see Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 
(analyzing three different looted art cases and the ways in which they progressed in US 
courts). 
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this lawsuit in the United States.9 The ruling forced Austria to return 
to the negotiating table, and eventually Altmann’s paintings were 
returned.10 
Altmann’s story is both typical and atypical.11 Although media 
coverage of many of the Holocaust restitution lawsuits was quite 
extensive, the Supreme Court heard very few Holocaust-era cases, 
and no other Supreme Court ruling resulted in favor of the plaintiffs.12 
However, the Supreme Court heard Altmann’s case and eventually 
provided a successful negotiation between Altmann and the Austrian 
government, making Altmann’s case atypical.13 On the other hand, 
Altmann’s case is typical in that her struggles with the Austrian 
government were futile and she was forced to pursue litigation to 
instigate a settlement.14 Most Holocaust restitution lawsuits began 
                                                                                                             
9. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) (holding narrowly that 
FSIA did not apply in this particular case and looking at the jurisdictional rather than 
substantive questions brought before the court); see Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 
(discussing the Altmann litigation in the American courts). 
10. See generally Charles H. Brower II, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 236-42 (2005) (describing the factual and historical background behind the Altmann case as 
well as the Supreme Court’s holding); see Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 (predicting 
that Austria would not return to the negotiating table and that Austria would “fight any attempt 
to return the paintings to Altmann”). 
11. See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER & KEARSTON G. EVERITT, HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION 
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE, ACLU INT’L CIVIL LIBERTIES REPORT 
(2004), https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/bazyler.pdf [hereinafter Bazyler Update] (discussing the 
successes of the Altmann case and how few cases there were like that); see also Brower II, 
supra note 10 (discussing the background of the Altmann case and how Mrs. Altmann worked 
for the return of her paintings through negotiations and litigation before finally they were 
returned through a settlement agreement). 
12. See Bazyler Update, supra note 11, at 1-6 (focusing on Garamendi and Altmann in a 
recent Supreme Court analysis); see generally MICHAEL BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE 
BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS (2003) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST JUSTICE] 
(providing an analysis and perspective on the various Holocaust-era litigation of the 1990s and 
early 2000s). The Supreme Court also heard Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 
(2003) (ruling that the Executive branch’s foreign policy regarding Holocaust-era insurance 
claims settlements through the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims 
(ICHEIC) “preempted any California state statutes that would require European insurers doing 
business in the state to reveal their Holocaust-era insurance records”); see generally Bazyler 
Update (providing an update about recent Holocaust litigation and the results of that litigation). 
13. See Bazyler Update (providing an update about the Altmann case successes in the 
Supreme Court); see generally Brower II, supra note 10, at 236-42 (discussing the Altmann 
case and the media surrounding it). 
14. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
547 U.S. 1206 (2006) (affirming the role of the Special Master and approving the Special 
Master’s funds allocation plan); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 
2d 164 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (describing the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the 
settlement reached). 
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because local governments were unwilling or unable to provide the 
support or restitution survivors needed and deserved.15 
In the mid-1990s, Holocaust restitution cases began to take on 
more force in the United States leading to global media attention and 
creating a social movement around Holocaust memory.16 In the early 
1990s, a number of Holocaust related events occurred: first, the 
blockbuster drama Schindler’s List debuted in theaters in March, 
1993; second, construction of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum 
(“USHMM”), which had been unanimously approved by Congress in 
1980, was finished in April 1993; third, by the late 1980s, Holocaust 
education bills were enacted in both California (in 1985) and Illinois 
(in 1989).17 These events, compounded with the rising victimhood 
culture of the 1990s, ushered in an era of increased attention to the 
Holocaust and corresponded with the exacerbation of Holocaust-era 
litigation.18 
Holocaust restitution was conducted predominantly through two 
mechanisms: class actions and international political negotiations.19 
The goal of this Note is twofold: (1) to understand the particular legal 
mechanisms available in the pursuit of Holocaust restitution and (2) to 
explain which mechanism was more effective. This Note will focus 
on three particular restitution cases—the Swiss Bank litigation and 
the Austrian Bank litigation—and the Austrian international political 
                                                                                                             
15. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing how the United States became involved 
in negotiating settlements and agreements between survivors and foreign governments); see 
also MARRUS, supra note 5, at 11-13 (describing the Swiss path to litigation and the 
invisibility of restitution claims until the outbreak of the class actions in the 1990s). 
16. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005782 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016); 
SCHINDLER’S List (Universal Studios, 1993) (portraying the story of Oskar Schindler who 
saved hundreds of Jews during the Holocaust). 
17. In 1991 and 1994, bills were passed promoting Holocaust education in New Jersey 
and New York, respectively. These bills required curriculum centered not only on the 
Holocaust but also human rights and genocide. Beyond Our Walls: State Profiles on Holocaust 
Education, http://www.ushmm.org/educators/beyond-our-walls-state-profiles-on-holocaust-
education  (click on each state to see when legislation was passed on Holocaust education, how 
the state mandates the curriculum, and other available resources) (describing the Holocaust 
education resources available in each state); NOVICK, supra note 6, at 258-61 (discussing 
Holocaust curricula). 
18. See generally EVA ILLOUZ, OPRAH WINFREY AND THE GLAMOUR OF MISERY: AN 
ESSAY ON POPULAR CULTURE (2003) (discussing the rise of victimhood culture in the United 
States); NOVICK, supra note 6, at 280 (noting that “the most powerful collective memories re 
usually memories of deep grievances). 
19. See infra Parts I and II (analyzing the use of class action litigation and international 
political negotiations, respectively). 
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negotiation process. This Note analyzes the Swiss and Austrian Banks 
litigations to demonstrate the disparate approaches to judicial 
oversight in negotiating class action settlements and the varied 
strategies chosen in negotiating these settlements. This Note also 
examines the Austrian international political negotiation process 
because it demonstrates the complexity of international negotiations 
and the many dynamic personalities involved in those processes. 
Holocaust restitution is now essentially over, with the only 
remaining cases involving looted art, yet the processes of the 
movement can be applied to subsequent historical wrongs.20 This 
Note will analyze the Holocaust Restitution Movement of the 1990s 
to determine the most successful strategy in order to understand how 
victims of the subsequent genocides and human rights abuses can use 
the Holocaust Restitution Movement as a rubric for pursuing 
restitution.21 It will also examine whether an international approach is 
applicable or necessary. 
Part I provides general background on Holocaust restitution 
leading up to the 1990s as well as background on the class action and 
international agreements mechanisms. Part II provides two examples 
of how class actions were used for Holocaust restitution in the 1990s, 
namely the Swiss banks and Austrian banks litigations. Part III 
analyzes the implementation of international agreements in 
Holocaust-era claims regarding Austrian restitution. Part IV 
demonstrates a framework for how survivors of subsequent genocide 
and mass human rights violations can use the Holocaust Restitution 
Movement as a framework for subsequent pursuits. The goal of this 
Note is to discuss how the application of the mechanisms laid out in 
the early sections of the Note can be used to create a multi-pronged 
                                                                                                             
20. See infra Part III (discussing application of the Holocaust Restitution Movement 
strategies to victims of subsequent genocides); infra note 199 (discussing the limitations 
placed on the Austrian settlements for further Holocaust-era claims, excluding looted art); 
infra note 60 (discussing current looted art cases). 
21. The Holocaust Restitution Movement has been referred to as a Movement by many 
scholars. See e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative 
Perspective, 20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 11 (2002) [hereinafter Comparative Perspective] 
(comparing the Holocaust Restitution Movement with cases and strategies from other 
movements); see also Vartges Saroyan, A Lesson from the Holocaust Restitution Movement for 
Armenians: Generate Momentum to Secure Restitution, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 285 
(2011) (discussing how the Holocaust Restitution Movement strategies can be used by 
survivors of the Armenian genocide); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. V. Italy), 
Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2012, at 199 (Feb. 2012) (J. Yusuf, dissenting) (discussing examples of 
individual claimants seeking compensation and restitution for violations of humanitarian law, 
including the Holocaust Restitution Movement). 
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and sophisticated restitution and compensation system for victims of 
subsequent genocide and mass human rights violations.22 
I. BACKGROUND: HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE AND THE CLASS ACTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS MECHANISMS 
This Section will provide background on the Holocaust 
restitution processes leading up to the 1990s as well as background on 
two of the critical mechanisms used for these processes in the 
1990s.23 Part I.A. will look at the types of Holocaust restitution 
processes prior to the 1990s. Part I.B. will provide a brief background 
on the class action mechanism. Part I.C. will provide a brief 
background on the international political negotiations mechanism. 
A. Background of Holocaust Restitution 
To best understand the context surrounding the Holocaust 
Restitution Movement in the 1990s, a brief background on restitution 
litigation and processes preceding the massive litigation of the 1990s 
is necessary.24 In the 1950s, most restitution programs were focused 
on welfare.25 Although there was no real restitution “movement” yet, 
a number of restitution programs were established in the late 1940s 
and 1950s.26 The Restitution from the Western Allied Zones program 
                                                                                                             
22. Although there can never be true justice in the wake of egregious wrongs, the 
successes of the Holocaust Restitution Movement can help provide a measure of justice, a 
form of imperfect justice, and, importantly, recognition for other victims. 
23. See infra Part I.A. (discussing Holocaust restitution background leading up to the 
1990s); infra Part I.B. (discussing the class action mechanism); infra Part I.C. (discussing the 
international agreements mechanism). 
24. See infra Part II (discussing the class action mechanism as a restitution strategy); 
infra Part III (discussing the international negotiation process as a restitution strategy). 
25. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 62 (describing the focus of restitution in the 1950s as 
providing relief for the “newly liberated”); see generally SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012) (explaining how human rights programs were not a 
completely new and innovative process in the 1940s and 50s, but rather drew upon earlier 
processes like welfare programs established in the 1920s). For example, In the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, articles 12 and 16-29 stipulate an individual’s right to 
social security, education, social order, and involvement in community life. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) (providing 
articles on how States should protect their citizen’s individual rights). 
26. See NOVICK, supra note 6, at 84 (describing American Jewish policies and intentions 
to care for Displaced Persons (DPs) in the aftermath of the war); see generally HOLOCAUST 
ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) 
(discussing welfare programs and needs). 
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was established in the late 1940s and was adjudicated through the 
1950s.27 The program provided payments to Holocaust survivors from 
the proceeds of selling restituted property.28 Payments were made to 
residents of the United States, Germany, Israel, and Great Britain.29 
The only requirement was that the recipients be former property 
owners or their heirs.30 Another program, the 
Bundesentschaedigungsgesetz (“BEG”), was established pursuant to 
the Luxembourg Agreement with Claims Conference Protocol 1.31 
Payments were made between 1953 and 2000, but the filing deadlines 
                                                                                                             
27. The Western Allied Zones refers to restitution programs in West Germany (including 
parts of Berlin). In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 
2000) (interim Special Master’s report) (providing a summary of major Holocaust 
Compensation Programs); see generally HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL 
WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) (describing the Restitution from 
Western Allied Zones program). 
28. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 2000) 
(interim Special Master’s report) (listing a number of compensation programs from the 1950s, 
including the Restitution from the Allied Zones program); see generally HOLOCAUST ERA 
ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) 
(describing the requirements of the Restitution from Western Allied Zones Program and other 
compensation programs). 
29. See HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI 
VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) (describing Holocaust restitution programs including the 
establishment of the Claims Conference); Benjamin Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: 
Permitting Litigation to Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 193, 199 (assessing international agreements and reparations settlements in the 
immediate postwar period); see Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor 
Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 503, 507 (2002) (describing early 
reparations and restitution programs in West Germany). 
30. See HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI 
VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) (discussing Holocaust restitution programs and their scope and 
duration); Vagts & Murray, supra note 29, at 507 (describing early reparations and restitution 
programs in West Germany). 
31. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 2000) 
(interim Special Master’s report) (providing a summary of major Holocaust Compensation 
Programs); see generally HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR 
JEWISH NAZI VICTIMS (Prague, June 2009) (describing the BEG restitution program). The 
Luxembourg Agreements formed the basis of German federal restitution and indemnification 
programs for Holocaust survivors. It was signed by the Federal Republic of Germany 
(“FRG”), the State of Israel and the Claims Conference, a program created to mediate claims 
between the FRG and Holocaust survivors. The agreements recognized West Germany’s 
individual debts to survivors as well as its debts to the “Jewish world.” The FRG, under the 
accord, had to pay DM 3 billion to Israel in annual installments in the form of goods and 
services. See 60 Years of the Claims Conference, CLAIMS CONFERENCE, 
http://forms.claimscon.org/Claims-Conference-60-Years.pdf (discussing the work of the 
Claims Conference over the course of sixty years); see generally Karen Heilig, From 
Luxembourg Agreements to Today: Representing a People, 20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 176 
(2002) (describing the Luxembourg Agreements and the work of the Claims Conference in 
general). 
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expired in 1969.32 The goal was to provide compensation for 
survivors and to help them relegate “the Holocaust to history.”33 The 
types of payments consisted of six different programs including a 
hardship fund providing a pension of DM5,122 annually to 1,757 
recipients as of 1998.34 While Europe struggled to provide some form 
of compensation for the victims of National Socialism, survivors 
themselves focused on returning to normalcy.35 
Restitution programs in the 1950s and 1960s predominantly 
relied on international diplomacy.36 One of the main considerations 
that led to improved relations between Israel and Austria in the 1950s 
was the payment of restitution to the Austrian Jewish community by 
                                                                                                             
32. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 2000) 
(interim Special Master’s report) (summarizing various compensation programs including 
scope and duration); Pollock, supra note 29, at 199 (discussing slave and forced labor 
compensation funds in the 1950s). 
33. Cf. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the focus of Holocaust survivors on 
moving on with their lives); NOVICK, supra note 6, at 84 (describing the United States’ and 
Israel’s goal of integrating survivors into society so as to relegate “the Holocaust to history”). 
34. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 
2000) (interim Special Master’s report) (providing a summary of major Holocaust 
Compensation Programs). Other programs included the Professional Damage fund which 
provided a pension of DM 11,584 annually to 8,382 recipients (as of 1998) for those with “no 
adequate subsistence;” the Loss of Freedom fund, a one-time payment of DM 5 for every day 
that the recipient had been imprisoned in a concentration camp or ghetto, subjected to forced 
labor, wore a Star of David (a form of restricting liberty), or who lived in hiding; other funds 
included Loss of Health, Loss of Life and Loss of Possessions or Property. See In re Holocaust 
Victims Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (ERK)(MDG) (Sept. 11, 2000) (interim Special Master’s 
report) (providing a summary of major Holocaust Compensation Programs); see generally 
HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI VICTIMS 
(Prague, June 2009) (discussing describing the requirements to qualify for BEG restitution). 
35. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 2 (describing how many survivors did not want to 
“dwell on the horrific past but to marry, raise a family and ‘make a living from ground zero’”). 
Survivors searched for missing relatives through radio programs, letters to friends they had 
been reunited with in displaced person camps (“DP camps”), and bulletins. See Interview with 
Haim Gouri, Israeli poet, in Jerusalem (Mar. 14, 2012) (discussing the Eichmann trial and how 
working with DPs in Vienna influenced Gouri’s perception and understanding of Holocaust 
memory). For more on National Socialism, see generally REVISITING THE NATIONAL 
SOCIALIST LEGACY (Oliver Rathkolb, 2004); WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY (1960); RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD 
REICH IN POWER (2005); Peter Caldwell, National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl 
Schmitt, Otto Koellreutter, and the Debate Over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937, 
CARDOZO L. REV. (1994); Hubert Rottleuthner, Legal Positivism and National Socialism: A 
Contribution to a Theory of Legal Development, GER. L.J. (2011). 
36. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 26 (describing the creation of the Claims Conference as a 
vehicle for negotiations between Israel and Germany); see generally Ronald Zweig, Jewish 
Issues in Israeli Foreign Policies: Israeli-Austrian Relations in the 1950s, 15 ISR. STUD. 47 
2010 (discussing international diplomacy between Austria and Israel in the aftermath of World 
War II). 
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the Austrian government.37 The focus of restitution in the 1950s was 
entirely on the “urgency of relief for the newly liberated.”38 
According to US diplomat Sumner Welles, “[t]he efforts today to 
right the wrongs which have been committed will be of all too little 
avail . . . but such measure of recompense as can be offered surely 
constitutes the moral obligation of the free people of the earth.”39 This 
approach, through negotiations and diplomacy, would frame the use 
of international negotiations in the restitution movement of the 
1990s.40 
Although there were restitution litigation claims prior to the 
1990s, they reached neither the scale nor the scope of the massive 
class action litigation of the 1990s.41 There were a number of reasons 
for this trend.42 First, in the postwar period Jews were virtually 
powerless and dispersed.43 Second, during the 1950s and 1960s, there 
was a focus predominantly on German restitution as evidenced by the 
establishment of German-Israeli reparations programs and the Claims 
Conference.44 Third, many archives and documents were inaccessible 
                                                                                                             
37. Zweig, supra note 36, at 47 (describing Israeli political relations soon after the 
creation of the state); see also EIZENSTAT supra note 1, at 26 (discussing how a non-
governmental organization, the Claims Conference, facilitated negotiations between two 
sovereign states). 
38. MARRUS, supra note 5, at 62 (discussing providing relief to the survivors who had 
only recently been liberated); Zweig, supra note 36, at 49 (describing the allocation of 
restitution for DP resettlement and rehabilitation). 
39. Literature concerning the issue of early restitution attempts details issues such as 
Israel’s acceptance of reparations from Germany, the welfare aid in European countries, and 
the influence of American diplomacy on these attempts. These policies mirror the overarching 
public consciousness of the time. See MARRUS supra note 5, at 62-75 (quoting Sumner 
Welles) (discussing reparations processes from the 1940s until the 1990s); see generally 
Zweig, supra note 36 (describing the allocation of restitution for DP resettlement and 
rehabilitation). 
40. See infra Part III (discussing the use of international negotiations). 
41. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 75-81 (describing the global developments that shaped 
the pursuit of restitution in the 1990s); Beker, supra note 5, at 1-32 (discussing national myth 
making as it relates to the Holocaust restitution process). See e.g., Princz v. Fed. Republic of 
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985).  
42. See infra notes 43-47 (discussing the various reasons for the restitution process in the 
1990s reaching the scope and scale that it did). 
43. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 70 (discussing why restitution took a “backseat” to 
reparations to the Allies); Beker, supra note 5, at 1-32 (providing a brief history and 
understanding of European mythmaking in explanation of the difficulty European countries 
had with facing their Holocaust-era history and memory). 
44. See MARRUS supra note 5, at 72 (explaining how the creation of the Claims 
Conference was revolutionary and paved the way for negotiations between Israel and 
Germany); Beker supra note 5, at 1-32 (providing a brief history and understanding of 
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until after the fall of Communism.45 Fourth, a new generation 
harbored in a period of reflection on the relative goods and evils of 
their parents.46 And fifth, in the 1990s the historical narratives of the 
Holocaust made room for those that had seemed like “minor” aspects, 
such as the despoliation of Jewish assets.47 
The earlier focus on international political negotiations as a 
method of restituting funds and property began to change in the 1980s 
and 1990s when the first class action suit was filed in 1985.48 
Holocaust survivors from Jasenovac, a concentration camp in former 
Yugoslavia, filed Handel v. Artukovic in the United States against a 
Croatian Ustase official in violation of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and the Yugoslavian 
Criminal Code.49 The case was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
                                                                                                             
European mythmaking in explanation of the difficulty European countries had with facing 
their Holocaust-era history and memory). Although technically the Claims Conference was 
established to facilitate restitution from Germany, its role has expanded to mediate restitution 
claims in other countries and contexts. See Heilig, supra note 31; 60 Years of the Claims 
Conference, CLAIMS CONFERENCE, http://forms.claimscon.org/Claims-Conference-60-Years.  
pdf (discussing the founding of the Claims Conference for the purposes of German restitution, 
but that the Claims Conference’s role expanded over time). 
45.  See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 77 (discussing how “the lifting of the Iron Curtain 
also made available new documentary sources to solve old puzzles”); Beker, supra note 5, at 
1-32 (providing a brief history and understanding of European mythmaking in explanation of 
the difficulty European countries had with facing their Holocaust-era history and memory). 
46. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 77-78 (discussing the follow of the Soviet bloc as a 
catalyst for the new states to deal with past wrongs); Beker, supra note 5, at 1-32 (discussing 
the influence of a new generation on memory politics in Europe). 
47. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 79 (describing the ways in which globalization brought 
to the fore formerly marginalized memories); Beker, supra note 5, at 1-32 (discussing the rise 
of alternative memory narratives after the fall of Communism). Additionally, because 
survivors were aging and dying at a rate of ten percent per year, there was a feeling of urgency 
to address individual reparations. MARRUS supra note 5, at 79 (describing the impact of age on 
the push for a restitution movement). 
48. See William Schabas, Foreword in MICHAEL MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: 
THE HOLOCAUST ERA RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S ix, xi (2009) (providing 
perspective on the historical trends that facilitated a Holocaust movement in the 1990s, namely 
a judicial atmosphere for class action, the end of the Cold War, and the opening of new 
archival documents); Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in 
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Nuremberg in America] 
(discussing the Handel case in the early 1980s). 
49. The Ustase were Croatian fascists who controlled Croatia between 1929 and 1945. 
They were in league with the Nazis, like Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. They remained 
relatively autonomous and implemented many of the Nazi regime’s policies against minorities 
by rounding up Jews, Roma, and Croat dissidents. The government was considered a Nazi 
Puppet State. See generally Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985) 
(bringing a criminal class action lawsuit against Nazi officials in the United States). See 
Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 22 (describing the factual and legal background for 
the Handel case). See also Balkan ‘Auschwitz’ haunts Croatia, BBC NEWS (April 25, 2005, 
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jurisdiction.50 Although the case was unsuccessful, the strategies and 
perspectives gathered from the case framed and shaped litigation 
strategies that followed, most specifically because the focus shifted 
from criminal litigation to civil claims.51 
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany was filed soon after 
Handel, and although it was not a class action lawsuit, it also 
provided strategies for subsequent litigation.52 In 1984, Hugo Princz, 
a US citizen who had been a forced laborer in Germany during World 
War II, began negotiations and inquiries through the State Department 
with Germany for the return of wages for his forced labor during 
World War II.53 However, the German government did not provide a 
resolution for Princz.54 Even with the involvement of the Clinton 
Administration, there was no change in the German government’s 
stance.55 In response, Princz brought a lawsuit in federal court 
claiming “false imprisonment, assault and battery, negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and quantum meruit.”56 
The suit failed because of the strict Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
standards and was again dismissed on appeal.57 
                                                                                                             
17:03 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4479837.stm; Croatian Holocaust Still Stirs 
Controversy, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2001, 11:04 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/progr  
ammes/from_our_own_correspondent/1673249.stm. 
50. See generally Handel, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (dismissing the case with prejudice); see 
Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 22 (describing the factual and legal background for 
the Handel case). 
51. See infra Part II (discussing the Swiss Bank Litigation); Interview with Martin 
Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) 
(explaining that the same plaintiffs’ lawyers who brought the Jasenovac case later brought the 
Swiss Bank litigation). 
52. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the background to the legal proceedings); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 
23-25 (discussing the Princz case and its progression through both legal and diplomatic 
channels). 
53. See generally Princz, 26 F.3d 1166 (discussing the background political discussions 
prior to the legal proceedings); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 23 (discussing the 
Princz political negotiations). 
54. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 23. 
55. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169 (holding that the FSIA is applicable for jurisdiction over 
a foreign State and that none of the exceptions, neither commercial activity nor the direct 
effect exception, applied to Princz’s case); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 23 
(discussing the Princz case and its progression through both legal and diplomatic channels). 
56. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168 (discussing Princz’s complaint and allegations); 
Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 24 (describing the factual and legal background for 
the Princz case). 
57. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176 (providing the court’s holding that the district court lacks 
jurisdiction); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 24 (discussing the district court’s denial 
of defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating “it is totally mystifying to this Court why the German 
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Princz ultimately won, although not in court.58 When Congress 
undertook efforts to allow Princz’s litigation to go forward, the 
German government settled with him and twenty-one others who had 
been US citizens during the Holocaust for US$2.1 million.59 This turn 
in focus towards litigation (more specifically class action litigation) 
combined with international negotiations foreshadows the strategies 
of the Holocaust litigation movement of the 1990s.60 
The Holocaust Restitution Movement of the 1990s was a 
multipronged and sophisticated movement that worked to restitute 
property, compensate survivors for forced labor, and retrieve dormant 
bank accounts, to name a few.61 The success of the movement 
stemmed from its ability to work within the judicial and executive 
branches.62 As a result of the intense push to resolve many of the 
outstanding claims and historical injustices, most Holocaust-era 
claims are now closed.63 Yet the lessons learned from trial and error 
                                                                                                             
Government not only wants to attack this Court’s jurisdiction, but also wants to reserve the 
right to contest the substance of Plaintiff’s claims. . . . Of course, if the German Government 
wants to try the Holocaust, this Court has no choice but to accommodate its wishes”). 
58. See HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73 (describing the slave labor payouts in 
1998 as a result of the litigation Princz filed in 1993); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, 
at 25 (summarizing the outcome and the legal objectives of the Princz case). 
59. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 73 (2003) (describing the slave labor payouts 
in 1998 as a result of the litigation Princz filed in 1993); Nuremberg in America, supra note 
48, at 25 (discussing the allocation of slave labor funds as a result of the Princz litigation and 
subsequent negotiations). “Holocaust-era” refers to all Holocaust related issues, claims, and 
litigation. It is a term used by academics and practitioners alike to refer to any claims that 
came out of the Holocaust, regardless of when they were resolved or litigated. 
60. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation); see infra Part III 
(discussing the use of international negotiations). 
61. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation); see infra Part III 
(discussing the use of international negotiations). For specific examples of application of 
Holocaust strategies, see Parts II and III, respectively detailing the use of litigation and 
international agreements. 
62. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 31-37 (discussing the vast sums 
plaintiffs won in the Swiss Bank litigation); see generally Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 
(providing three examples of looted art cases including the Altmann case, which could only 
proceed after the Executive Agreement with Austria was signed). 
63. See Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York (Mar. 17, 2014) (“[A]nd I’m not sure there is anyone left. I can give you a list but I don’t 
think they’re alive. But even the notion of civil relief is something that’s probably past. Its no 
longer ripe, its overripe. Time to be discarded and move on to something else.”); HOLOCAUST 
JUSTICE supra note 12, at 286 (discussing the legacies of the Holocaust Restitution 
Movement). The Executive Agreements barred all future litigation in the American court 
system relating to Holocaust-era claims against the governments who were signatories to the 
agreements. However, today there are still many looted art cases that remain and are still 
considered legally viable. See Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 (discussing three looted art 
cases that involved high profile litigation in the early 2000s); William D. Cohan, The 
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and the strategies employed have long-term implications for the 
survivors of subsequent genocides and mass human rights 
violations.64 
B. The Class Action Mechanism: The US Litigation Tool 
Many Holocaust victims used the US class action mechanism to 
pursue restitution because it allowed consolidation of many small 
claims into a single action.65 Class action litigation allows for 
increased efficiency because it provides cases with “large aggregate 
damages to proceed even when individual damages are small.”66 
Class actions also allow for lower litigation costs because courts can 
avoid hearing multiple small claims, and instead hear one 
consolidated class action.67 The class action procedure is governed by 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.68 In order to 
consolidate actions into a class, Rule 23(a) requires 
                                                                                                             
Restitution Struggle: Malaise, Indifference, and Frustration, ARTNews, http://www.art 
news.com/2013/09/11/the-restitution-struggle/ (Sept. 11, 2013, 8:00 AM) (“[D]ecades after the 
effort began, hundreds of thousands of artworks and other objects looted from victims of the 
Holocaust have yet to be returned o the owners of their heirs.”); Elizabeth Campbell Karlsgodt, 
Why are Museums Holding on to Art Looted by Nazis?, NEWSWEEK, http://www.newsweek. 
com/why-are-museums-holding-art-looted-nazis-330393 (May 10, 2015, 12:24 PM)  
(discussing the recent film The Woman in Gold and the looted art remaining in museums 
today); Remarks by Ronald S. Lauder in Zurich: ‘A Crime Committed 80 years ago continues 
to Stain the World of Art Today, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/remarks-by-ronald-s-lauder-in-zurich-a-crime-
committed-80-years-ago-continues-to-stain-the-world-of-art-today-2-2-2016. 
64. See infra Part IV (discussing application of Holocaust strategies to other genocides). 
65. Jade Brewster, A Kick in the Class: Giving Class Members a Voice in Class Action 
Settlements, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (providing a brief overview of the class action 
mechanism and then analyzing the problems inherent to class actions); see generally Jack B. 
Weinstein, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, 
CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995) (providing an overarching 
analysis and discussion of the class action mechanism for tort litigation and its application). 
66. J. Brewster, supra note 65, at 3-14 (analyzing the class action mechanism’s inherent 
problems like agency issues, problems with collective action, and judicial estimation of value 
and its “overall undemocratic system of litigation”); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (discussing the class actions’ ability to overcome problems with 
small recoveries, which would deter individuals from bringing solo actions). 
67. J. Brewster, supra note 65, at 3-14 (analyzing the class action mechanism’s inherent 
problems like agency issues, problems with collective action, and judicial estimation of value 
and its “overall undemocratic system of litigation”); see generally Weinstein, supra note 65 
(providing an overarching analysis and discussion of the class action mechanism for tort 
litigation and its application). 
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (providing each of the rules governing the class action 
mechanism); see also Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the 
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(1) the class [to be] so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.69 
A class action can be maintained if the above requirements from Rule 
23(a) are satisfied and if any of the three elements outlined in Rule 
23(b) can be satisfied.70 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) provides that a class can be 
certified if there would be inconsistent results or adjudication among 
class members that would create an incompatible standard by 
opposing that class.71 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that a class could 
otherwise be certified if separate adjudication would impede the 
members’ “ability to protect their interests.”72 Rule 23(b)(2) applies, 
like 23(b)(1), for classes pursuing injunctive relief where “the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class” so relief is appropriate for the class as a 
whole.73 By contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) looks at whether there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class members that 
predominate over any questions affecting individual members and 
where a class action would be superior to other methods of “fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”74 
                                                                                                             
Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 212 (2002) (discussing the use of 
the class action mechanism in Holocaust restitution litigation). 
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (providing the prerequisites for certifying a class action); 
see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613 (explaining the requirements to meet the prerequisites for 
application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). 
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing that there are additional prerequisites aside from 
23(a) that must be satisfied for a class to be maintained); Weinstein, supra note 65, at 134 
(describing Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) as “mandatory class actions that do not allow class 
members to opt out and bring their own suits”). 
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (providing that inconsistent adjudications could be 
problematic because of inconsistencies they would cause); Weinstein, supra note 65, at 135 
(discussing application of Rule 23(b)). 
72. FED. R. CIV. P.  23(b)(1)(B) (providing another element that would make a class 
action more desirable as compared to individual adjudications); Weinstein, supra note 65, at 
135 (discussing attempts to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as unsuccessful because of a 
“failure or inability to prove the existence of a limited fund—and even when a limited fund 
was shown, some appellate courts and some plaintiff’s attorneys favor bankruptcy over the 
class action”). 
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing of instances when injunctive relief would be 
appropriate); see generally Weinstein, supra note 65, at 135 (discussing the application of 
Rule 23(b)(2) class certification). 
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (providing elements of commonality, predominance, and 
superiority as necessary for class certification); Weinstein, supra note 65, at 135 (1995) 
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A key provision of the class action process is the notice 
procedure.75 Rule 23(c)(2) provides that the court may “direct 
appropriate notice to the class” depending on what is “practicable 
under the circumstances.”76 Notice requires, in clear and concise 
language: (1) the nature of the action, (2) a definition of the class, (3) 
the claims, issue or defenses of the class, (4) that class members may 
employ an attorney to appear for him or her, (5) that exclusion from 
the class may be requested, (6) the time and procedure for requesting 
exclusion, and (7) that class judgments are binding on members under 
Rule 23(c)(3).77 These features of the class action mechanism allow 
potential class members to first and foremost learn about a potential 
class action suit, and to respond appropriately should they wish to be 
excluded.78 Another important feature of the class action mechanism, 
particularly for Holocaust restitution claims, is the settlement 
provision in Rule 23(e).79 For the application of a class action 
settlement, Rule 23(e) requires directed notice to the members who 
would be affected by the proposal and a ruling on whether the 
settlement is “fair, reasonable and adequate.”80 
There is extensive case law developing the scope and application 
of Rule 23.81 In Weinberger v. Kendrick, the court analyzed whether 
                                                                                                             
(asserting that 23(b)(3) claims are more common because they allow for claims of money 
damages, and allow for class members to opt out and bring individual claims). 
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23I(2) (providing the relevant procedures to satisfy the notice 
requirement); Ratner, supra note 68, at 217 (discussing the notice process for the Swiss bank 
litigation). 
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (providing the relevant procedures to satisfy the notice 
requirement); cf. Ratner, supra note 67, at 217 (outlining the notice requirements and the 
process of satisfying those requirements in the Swiss Bank litigation). 
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing the components necessary in a notice to 
potential class members); see also Ratner, supra note 67, at 217 (discussing the notice process 
for the Swiss bank litigation). 
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing the components necessary in a notice to 
potential class members); see also Ratner, supra note 67, at 217 (discussing the notice process 
for the Swiss bank litigation). 
79. See FED. R. CIV. P.  23(e) (providing the notice, finding and approval requirements 
for a class action settlement); see generally Weinstein, supra note 65 (providing an 
overarching analysis and discussion of the class action mechanism for tort litigation and its 
application). 
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)-(2) (providing the notice requirement and the fairness 
hearing requirement); see generally Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(discussing the settlement hearings for two bank class actions). 
81. See generally Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (analyzing an 
asbestos class action based on predominance and adequacy considerations); Stephenson v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (attacking a class action settlement asserting that 
appellants were not adequately represented during settlement); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 
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the settlement notice met Rule 23 requirements and whether class 
certification simultaneous with settlement precluded approval of the 
settlement.82 The court found that notice must “fairly apprise the 
prospective members of the class of the terms of the proposed 
settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with 
[the] proceedings.”83 The court held that class members had ample 
opportunity to investigate the settlement further and were informed in 
notice of this right as well as the settlement components.84 Appellants 
also argued that contemporaneous settlement and class approval was 
problematic.85 The court, however, found that temporary settlement 
classes can be “quite useful in resolving major class action disputes,” 
even though their use is still controversial.86 The court decided not to 
adopt a per se rule prohibiting the approval of class action settlements 
when settlement classes are certified after settlement. The court then 
underscored that it falls on the district judges to decide whether to 
employ the procedure and who are then bound to scrutinize the 
fairness of the settlement agreement at a higher level than they 
usually would.87 
                                                                                                             
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing application of a class action settlement where appellants 
raised issues with notice and certification of class and settlement simultaneously); City of 
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (responding to questions concerning 
excessiveness of attorney’s fees); Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.D.R. 643 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(applying Rule 23 prerequisites like numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of 
representation, and predominance, but not meeting superiority requirements). 
82. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 72 (1982) (analyzing whether the simultaneous class and 
settlement certification would invalidate a settlement); see Henry J. Reske, Making Class 
Distinctions Critics Say Class Action Proposals Encourage Collusion As Well As Settlements, 
ABA J., January 1997, at 22 (raising potential problems with simultaneous class and 
settlement approval, like collusion between plaintiffs’ attorneys). 
83. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 70 (1982) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (defining the necessary components for notice); see 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (providing notice requirements). 
84. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 70-71 (1982) (describing the court’s holding on appellant’s 
opportunity to review notice); Reske, supra note 81, at 22 (analyzing the potential issues 
where notice is not effective for simultaneous class and settlement certification). 
85. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 72 (1982) (discussing whether appellant’s contention of 
problematic simultaneous certification of class and settlement was problematic); see Reske, 
supra note 81, at 22 (describing potential problems with simultaneous approval like plaintiff’s 
attorneys colluding and defense “seeking protection from future claims”). 
86. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 72-73 (finding use in temporary class certification and 
settlement approval); see generally In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 
145-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the court’s acceptance of the class action settlement). 
87. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73 (1982) (discussing the court’s ruling that settlement 
classes should not be prohibited but must undergo higher scrutiny for fairness); Plummer v. 
Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 657 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that “although tentative designations of 
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Although the court in Weinberger noted benefits to 
contemporaneous approval of class and settlement, the Supreme 
Court found that class actions should not be litigated so that in the 
same day the court would be presented with a complaint, an answer, a 
proposed settlement, and a joint motion for conditional class 
certification.88 The Court held that although the parties reached a 
global compromise, there was no assurance that the diverse group of 
individuals affected were fairly or adequately represented.89 Thus, 
while class action settlements had become more commonplace and 
acceptable by the time of the Holocaust Restitution Movement, 
limitations were set on the procedural applications of the class action 
settlement.90 
C. International Political Negotiations: Creating International 
Agreements in Austria and the United States 
Holocaust restitution claims frequently involved the use of 
international agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, through 
international negotiations.91 The most successful international 
agreements involve political acceptance from the beginning of the 
                                                                                                             
class for settlement purposes are not uncommon, they have been the subject of considerable 
controversy”). 
88. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601-02 (discussing the court’s finding that such 
application of the class action mechanism is inappropriate); see generally George F. Sanderson 
III, Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative Proposals 
Past and Present, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 315 (1999) (providing a survey of 
Congressional actions undertaken to respond to the court’s Amchem holding). 
89. See Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 620 (describing the representation 
problems that arose due to the settlement procedure); Sanderson III, supra note 88, at 315-16 
(discussing the court’s reluctance to apply the procedural mechanisms used by the district 
court as a clear indication of necessary Congressional intervention). 
90. See e.g., Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (analyzing an asbestos 
class action based on predominance and adequacy considerations); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 
698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the settlement hearings for two bank class actions). 
91. See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Foundation 
“Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” Ger.-U.S., (July 17, 2000), http://www.  
swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_18_german_f.pdf (providing the agreement between 
the United States and Germany concerning the slave labor reconciliation agreement); 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
France Concerning Payments of Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, Fr.-U.S., Jan. 
18, 2001, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28994.pdf (providing an 
agreement between the United States and France concerning returning bank accounts, 
providing compensation for losses suffered during World War II, and compensating elderly 
survivors abroad); see infra Part II.B (discussing the Austrian negotiation process and 
subsequent international agreements). 
2016] THE HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION MOVEMENT 149 
negotiations so as to build consent early on.92 Successful agreements 
require domestic constituent support in the states involved in the 
negotiation.93 These include political parties, civil society groups, and 
governmental bureaucracies.94 Within the context of human rights 
agreements, States enter into these agreements not out of altruism, but 
rather by acting in a capacity that they perceive as required of them.95 
Governments enter into negotiations over human rights agreements 
because they see potential gains such as improving their position vis-
à-vis other international actors, improving their relationship vis-à-vis 
domestic actors, improving their reputation, or attaining domestic 
goals.96 
                                                                                                             
92. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 V. J. 
INT’L L. 501, 506 (2004) (describing the importance participation by governmental and non-
governmental associations in international human rights so that “domestic internalization of 
the norms can occur through a variety of means, including incorporation into the legal system 
through judicial interpretation, acceptance by political elites, and the like”); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961 (2002) 
(analyzing the importance of “domestic internalization of the norms can occur through a 
variety of means, including incorporation into the legal system through judicial interpretation, 
acceptance by political elites, and the like.”). 
93. See R. Brewster, supra note 92, at 510 (discussing how “[t]reaty arrangements need 
domestic support and not all agreements that enhance general welfare will be able to garner 
such support”); Hathaway, supra note 92, at 1961 (arguing that “[d]omestic institutions 
thereby enmesh international legal norms, generating self-reinforcing patterns of 
compliance”). 
94. R. Brewster, supra note 92, at 506 (discussing the way in which domestic interest 
groups lobby governments to comply with international agreements); Anne Marie Slaughter, A 
Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240, 242 (2000) 
(explaining that “International society is a society of states; international law seeks to achieve 
the goals and values of that society; it does so primarily by regulating states”). 
95. See R. Brewster, supra note 92, at 506 (describing the “demand for treaties as being 
driven by opportunities for mutual gain at the international level); see also Hathaway, supra 
note 92, at 2005-06 (explaining that ratifying an international human rights treaties “declares 
to the world that the principles outlined in the treaty are consistent with the ratifying 
government’s commitment to human rights”). 
96. See Hathaway, supra note 92, at 1941 (discussing how human rights treaties “declare 
or express to the international community the position of countries that have ratified. The 
position taken by countries in such instances can be sincere, but it need not be”). But see Jack 
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1113, 1135 (1999) (explaining that “a reputation for compliance with international law is not 
necessarily the best means—and certainly not the only means—for accomplishing foreign 
policy objectives”). The Holocaust restitution agreements and negotiations can be understood 
as international bilateral human rights agreements that ensured restitution and compensation 
for historical wrongs and sought to fill a gap in the welfare available to aging survivors both 
within the countries signing the agreements, like Austria, and within other countries, like 
Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus. See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the 
Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” Ger.-U.S., July 17, 2000, 
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This Note will focus on how these international agreements 
become law and how they interact with judicial structures in the 
United States and Austria. In the United States, international 
agreements are conducted through the Executive Branch.97 There are 
three types of executive agreements: sole executive agreements, pre-
authorized executive agreements, and implied executive agreements.98 
The Executive approves sole executive agreements unilaterally, 
without any congressional consent, where authority for the agreement 
arises from the Executive’s power to determine foreign policy.99 Pre-
authorized executive agreements, or “ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements,” are negotiated by the President with authority delegated 
to him by Congress.100 They require no subsequent congressional 
approval and may enter into force once executed by the President or 
his representative.101 Implied executive agreements derive from 
implied executive authority.102 In these instances, Congress has 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_18_german_f.pdf (providing 
the agreement between the United States and Germany where slave labor compensation would 
be given to survivors abroad as well); Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of France Concerning Payments of Certain Losses 
Suffered During World War II, Fr.-U.S., Jan. 18, 2001, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28994.pdf (providing an agreement between the 
United States and France where compensation would be provided for survivors in Eastern 
European countries); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, 
in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing his role in the international negotiations as 
“representing individuals. I was also representing the governments of Belarus, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia, Ukraine”). 
97. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3 (discussing the 
Executive’s disposition to using Executive Agreements); Hathaway, supra note 92, at 153 
(describing a number of agreements entered into by the US government with express 
Congressional approval). 
98. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3 (discussing the 
Executive’s disposition to using Executive Agreements); Hathaway, supra note 92, at 153 
(describing a number of agreements entered into by the US government with express 
Congressional approval). 
99. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3 (describing implications 
of Executive execution of unilateral agreements); Hathaway, supra note 92, at 146 (explaining 
that the President should be a leading actor but not the sole actor in executing Executive 
Agreements). 
100. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3 (discussing the potential 
failings with delegated agreements: “(1) the delegations are often broad and often lack time 
limits; (2) there are few, if any, provisions specifically addressing congressional oversight; 
and, (3) even if a majority of the Congress were to object to an executive’s agreement, that 
objection would likely be subject to potential veto”); Hathaway, supra note 92, at 149 
(explaining that ex ante agreements make up the majority of current executive agreements). 
101. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3. 
102. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3 (asserting that implied 
agreements can often be derived out of necessity); see generally Daniel Abebe, Eric A. Posner, 
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affirmed the executive authority, but there are still implementation 
considerations that the Executive needs to work out.103 
In the Holocaust-era related issues agreements, the US 
government acted more as a mediator between specific claimants and 
foreign governments.104 Instead of facilitating an agreement that 
would bind US foreign policy and conduct (with or without 
congressional approval), the Holocaust-era executive agreements 
bound specific claimants, whether or not they are US citizens, who 
might use the US judicial system to file claims against foreign 
governments.105 The international agreements limited all future legal 
actions against the countries bound by the agreement and obligated 
the US government to file Statements of Interest in all pending and 
future Nazi-era claims.106 
By contrast, in the Austrian Federal State, the Bund, or 
Federation, has the power to conclude international treaties without 
being bound by “the allocation of powers between the States and the 
Federation.”107 Additionally, Austrian States have limited power to 
accept international treaties based on Article 16 of the Federal 
Constitution.108 In either event, the Federal President has the final 
                                                                                                             
The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507 (2011) (arguing that judicial 
deference should be given to executive agreements involving foreign policy). 
103. 2 Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 10:3. 
104. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 366 (discussing how the US government “urged other 
countries to provide justice to victims as a moral imperative”); Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 
(describing the various parties involved in the negotiation process). 
105. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 366 (asserting that the negotiations could stand as 
precedent for how to address injustices outside the judicial system); Ratner, supra note 68, at 
231 (describing the inadequacies of the negotiations in comparison to the class action 
settlements). 
106. Ratner, supra note 68, at 227 (discussing the requirements placed on the United 
States government as a signatory to the agreements); see e.g., Statement of Interest of the 
United States, In re Austrian and German Bank Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) aff’d sub. nom., D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 98-3938) 
(describing the American statement in the Austrian and German bank litigation as a result of 
the Executive Agreement). 
107. Soja Neudorfer & Claudia Wernig, Implementation of International Treaties into 
National Legal Orders: The Protection of the Rights of the Child within the Austrian Legal 
System, Max Planck UNYB 14, 414 (2010) (discussing the process by which international 
treaties become binding law in Austria); see BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBL 
No. 1/1920, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL | No. 2/2009, art. 
15(a), ¶ 3, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Austria_2009.pdf (Austria) 
(providing that “[t]he principles of international law concerning treaties shall apply to 
agreements within the meaning of para I above”). 
108. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBL No. 1/1920, as last amended by 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL | No. 2/2009, art. 16, ¶ 1, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Austria_2009.pdf (Austria) (providing in 
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responsibility of and authority for binding Austria to an agreement.109 
In certain cases, like political treaties, international treaties that 
amend the fundamental treaties of the European Union, and treaties 
that modify or supplement existing laws, parliamentary approval is 
also required.110 
Examples of early restitution agreements dealing with Holocaust 
restitution stem back to the immediate postwar period.111 Reparations 
projects in West Germany in the 1950s, for example, focused on 
compensating those who lost their lives, health, or freedom due to 
National Socialism.112 These compensation programs, however, were 
limited both in the scope of funds available and geographically to 
certain territories.113 
                                                                                                             
pertinent part “In matters within their own sphere of competence the Laender can conclude 
treaties with states, or their constituent states, bordering on Austria”); Neudorfer et. al, supra 
note 107, at 414 (discussing the incorporation of international treaties into local state-level 
law). 
109. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBL No. 1/1920, as last amended by 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL | No. 2/2009, art. 65 ¶ 1, https://www.constitute 
project.org/constitution/Austria_2009.pdf (Austria) (providing in pertinent part, “The Federal 
President represents the Republic internationally, receives and accredits envoys, sanctions the 
appointment of foreign consuls, appoints the consular representatives of the Republic abroad 
and concludes state treaties. Upon the conclusion of a state treaty not falling under Art. 50 or a 
state treaty pursuant to Art. 16 para I which neither modifies nor complements existent laws, 
he can direct that the treaty in question shall be implemented by the issue of ordinances.”); 
Neudorfer et. al, supra note 107, at 414 (describing the Federal President’s role in binding 
Austria to international agreements). 
110. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBL No. 1/1920, as last amended by 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL | No. 2/2009, art. 50, ¶ 1, https://www.constitute 
project.org/constitution/Austria_2009.pdf (Austria) (providing in pertinent part, “the 
conclusion of (1) political state treaties and state treaties the contents of which modify or 
complement existent laws and do not fall under Art. 16 para 1, as well as (2) state treaties by 
which the contractual bases of the European Union are modified, require the approval of the 
National Council”); Neudorfer et. al, supra note 107, at 414-15 (discussing instances where 
parliamentary involvement is necessary prior to incorporation of a treaty into Austrian law). 
111. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the background of Holocaust restitution programs). 
112. Pollock, supra note 29, at 199 (assessing international agreements and reparations 
settlements in the immediate postwar period); see Vagts et. al, supra note 28, at 507 
(describing early reparations and restitution programs in West Germany). 
113. It is estimated that DM 100 billion was paid in accordance with compensation laws 
and bilateral treaties but did not provide a final or comprehensive settlement. See Pollock, 
supra note 29, at 199 (discussing the limitations of restitution projects in the immediate 
postwar period); see MARRUS, supra note 5, at 67 (explaining that some complained about the 
German payments “frittering away” on “a winter coat here or a soup kitchen there” while the 
money should be used for reconstructing Jewish life). Programs in this period provided 
parameters for compensation like that only for those survivors who remained in Germany 
could receive payment under West Germany’s Federal Compensation Law of 1956. 
Furthermore, the compensation program only allowed for survivors of forced or slave labor to 
receive compensation. Thus, both the scope in terms of geography and survivor group was 
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II. APPLYING THE CLASS ACTION MECHANISM: THE SWISS 
AND AUSTRIAN BANKS CASES 
This Section will discuss the application of the class action in 
two particular cases studies.114 Part II.A. will develop the analysis of 
the class action mechanism through the context of the Swiss Banks 
litigation and Part II.B. will do so through the Austrian Banks 
litigation.115 
A. The Swiss Banks Litigation: The Involvement of the Court 
Dictating Negotiations 
 In October 1996, the same group of plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
fought diligently in Handel brought a similar class action suit against 
the Swiss Banks claiming restitution.116 Unlike Handel, the case 
settled and the survivors received compensation.117 The Swiss Banks 
                                                                                                             
limited. See Pollock, supra note 29, at 199 (describing restitution projects within West 
Germany); Vagts & Murray supra note 29, at 507 (2002) (describing reparations processes in 
the 1950s, such as the Agreement on German External Debts (the London Agreement) and the 
West German Federal Compensation Law of 1956). 
114. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation); infra Part II.B. 
(discussing the Austrian Bank litigation). 
115. See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y 
2000) (describing the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the settlement 
reached); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) aff’d sub nom. D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the 
Austrian bank litigation and the appointment of a Special Master). See In re Holocaust Victims 
Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the fairness of the class action 
settlement reached by the parties after initiation of class action litigation and establishing the 
role of a Special Master); In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1206 (2006) (affirming the role of the Special Master and approving the 
Special Master’s funds allocation plan). 
116. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 31 (providing a summary of the Swiss 
Bank litigation and demonstrating how the claims consisted of “a consolidated federal class 
action against the three largest Swiss banks for failure to return monies deposited with them 
during World War II and for other damages, an individual action against the same Swiss banks 
filed in California state court and a suit against the central bank of Switzerland accusing the 
bank of accepting looted-assets from Nazi Germany”); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, 
Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (providing perspective 
on the Austrian Holocaust restitution cases and negotiations in the context of his work as a 
litigation lawyer). See e.g., Complaint, Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. CV-96-
4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3, 1996 & Amended Complaint filed July 30, 1997) (filing of a class 
action by Holocaust survivors against the three largest Swiss banks, including Union Bank of 
Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, Credit Suisse, and others). See also Jodi Berlin Ganz, 
Heirs Without Assets and Assets Without Heirs: Recovering and Reclaiming Dormant Swiss 
Bank Accounts, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1306 (1996). 
117. Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (providing perspective on the Austrian Holocaust restitution cases 
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class action was a critical juncture for the future of the Holocaust 
Restitution Movement.118 Although the consolidated class action was 
the second filed in the United States dealing with the Holocaust, it 
was the first ever Holocaust-era class action lawsuit to result in 
success.119 Additionally, the extensive motions to dismiss and 
plaintiffs’ counter-motions remain useful tools for any future or 
ongoing Holocaust-era restitution attorneys.120 The court’s decision 
on whether to grant or deny a defendant’s motion to dismiss is, apart 
from the trial itself, the most important stage in an international 
litigation lawsuit.121 Finally, the Swiss Banks litigation is an 
important milestone in the Holocaust Restitution Movement because 
it “resulted in the largest settlement of a human rights case in the 
history of United States litigation.”122 The settlement also exposed the 
various issues that arise when determining how to allocate and 
disperse funds.123 Some distribution issues include assessing how to 
distribute the settlement funds to varied classes with differing criteria 
                                                                                                             
and negotiations in the context of his work as a litigation lawyer); see Melvyn I. Weiss, A 
Litigator’s Postscript on the Swiss Banks and Holocaust Litigation Settlements: How Justice 
Was Served, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS 
LEGACY 105 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger Alford eds. 2006) (describing the Swiss bank 
litigation and its compensation to survivors). 
118. See Weiss, supra note 117, at 105 (describing the reasons why the Swiss Bank 
settlement was unprecedented); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 31 (discussing the 
importance of the Swiss Banks litigation). 
119. The consolidated class action included a class so numerous, that it would be difficult 
to find a precise number of plaintiffs. Each individual case, prior to consolidation, included 
between seven and fifteen named plaintiffs, and hundreds of unnamed plaintiffs. See Beker, 
supra note 5, at 145-46 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (outlining the sums of money paid in the 
settlement action and the extent to which Switzerland had to be pushed to acknowledge their 
wartime actions); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing the class action 
settlement and emphasizing the relative successes of the litigation). 
120. And potentially any genocide related restitution cases. See generally Bazyler, supra 
note 21 (comparing the Holocaust Restitution Movement with other restitution movements). 
See generally Alfred de Zayas, The Principle of Reparation in International Law and the 
Armenian Genocide, ARMENIAN GENOCIDE CONF. 1 (2010) (discussing the applicability of 
Holocaust restitution claims in claims by survivors of the Armenian genocide). 
121. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (describing various successful 
elements of the litigation); see generally Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 11 
(providing rubrics and comparisons for the Holocaust litigation techniques and methods). 
122. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing the vast impact of the Swiss 
Bank litigation). See also Beker, supra note 5, at 142-163 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (describing 
the “demystification” of Swiss neutrality during the war and the successes of the Holocaust 
Restitution Movement to resurge that part of Swiss history). 
123. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing issues like allocating 
funds for attorneys’ fees and the various parties vying for the funds); In re Holocaust Victim 
Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the allocation of funds 
to various classes of beneficiaries). 
2016] THE HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION MOVEMENT 155 
and class members living around the world, methods to comply with 
the notice requirement, and how much would eventually be 
distributed to the survivors themselves.124 Along with the distribution 
problem, the Swiss Banks settlement also raised for the first time the 
ethical question of whether lawyers in cases like the Holocaust 
restitution cases should take a fee for their services.125 
The Swiss Banks litigation began when several separate class 
actions were filed against a number of Swiss Banks in the US District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York.126 The Swiss Banks were 
accused of the following: first, of collaborating with the Nazis by 
“knowingly trading ‘Nazi gold,’ laundering Nazi seized (‘looted’) 
assets, [and] profiteering from slave and forced labor”127; second, of 
concealing the extent and nature of their unlawful conduct following 
the Holocaust128; and third, of participating in a scheme to retain the 
assets Holocaust victims deposited voluntarily in Swiss accounts and 
safe deposit boxes in anticipation of World War II.129 
                                                                                                             
124. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing issues like allocating 
funds for attorneys’ fees and the various parties vying for the funds); In re Holocaust Victim 
Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the allocation of funds 
to various classes of beneficiaries). In response to the notice published in May 2000, 550,000 
individuals from around the world submitted questionnaires, the suggested method for 
participating in claims processes. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 218 (discussing the allocation 
and distribution of settlement funds); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 91 (discussing 
the allocation of funds and how from US$1.25 billion, two percent went towards legal fees and 
two percent went to legal fees and costs). 
125. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 33 (describing how the class action 
raised concerns over the allocation of attorneys’ fees); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 
105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the claims concerning allocation of 
attorneys’ fees). 
126. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(providing background on the Swiss Banks litigation); Weiss, supra note 117, at 104 
(explaining from the plaintiff’s perspective how the litigation process unfolded). 
127. Nazi gold encompasses gold looted by the Nazis from the treasuries of conquered 
countries and individuals. Weiss, supra note 117, at 104 (describing the various claims against 
the Banks that led to the creation of different classes); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 
105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the complaint and the classes listed in 
the complaint). See Weiss, supra note 117, at 104 (discussing Swiss concealment of looted 
assets); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(describing Plaintiff’s allegations that the Swiss concealed looted assets). 
128. Weiss, supra note 117, at 103 (discussing the accusations against the Swiss for 
knowingly concealing information); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 
141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing how the Swiss concealed relevant facts and documents 
concerning involvement in Nazi looting). 
129. Weiss, supra note 117, at 104 (describing the accusations lodged against the Swiss 
Banks); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(discussing the “Deposited assets Claims” against the Swiss Banks). 
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The Swiss Banks cases were consolidated into one class action 
and brought before Chief Judge Edward R. Korman in the Eastern 
District of New York.130 Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing 
that plaintiffs failed to state claims under international and Swiss law, 
lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction, failed to join 
indispensable parties, and lacked standing.131 Defendants also argued 
that the Court should abstain from adjudicating so that ongoing non-
judicial initiatives to redress plaintiffs’ claims could continue and that 
Switzerland, rather than the United States, was the proper forum for 
relief.132 
In July 1997, the plaintiffs filed amended complaints by 
dropping certain parties, adding others, and reconfiguring a few of the 
named parties.133 The following month, Judge Korman heard oral 
arguments on the motions to dismiss.134 Instead of ruling on the 
motions, Judge Korman made no decision for over a year.135 Without 
ever having to rule on the dismissal motions, Judge Korman achieved 
a settlement, which was “all-inclusive and require[ed] plaintiffs to 
dismiss every lawsuit filed against the Swiss banks and the Swiss 
government as a condition of the settlement.”136 
                                                                                                             
130. See Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 47, at 40-58 (summarizing the 
extensive motions and defenses brought by the Swiss Banks’ defense team); In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the lengthy 
process towards settlement and defenses raised). 
131. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 40-58 (summarizing the extensive 
motions to dismiss); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (describing the lengthy defendants’ motions to dismiss). 
132. Id. Interestingly, the Swiss Banks’ motions to dismiss for jurisdiction did not 
include FSIA. Those motions included Forum Non Conveniens, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 48, at 40-49 (discussing defendants’ procedural motions to dismiss). 
133. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 214-15 (discussing the motions and discussions that 
occurred in the year long gap before settlement); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 61-
62 (describing the factors leading up to settlement). 
134. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 214-15 (discussing Judge Korman’s involvement in 
the settlement process); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 61-62 (describing Judge 
Korman’s extensive involvement in the settlement process). 
135. See Ratner, supra note 67, at 216 (describing the settlement agreement reached in 
the court’s chambers in August 1998); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 62 (discussing 
Judge Korman’s involvement in the settlement process and decision to wait a year before 
ruling on any motions). 
136. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 62 (describing aspects of the settlement 
agreement); see generally Settlement Agreement, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. CV-95-
4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 26, 1999) (hereinafter Settlement Agreement) (describing the 
components of the settlement between the parties). The Settlement laid out the following 
elements: (1) the Settlement Fund: the defendants agreed to pay US 1.25billion in four 
installments over three years between 1998 and 2001; (2) Defenses Waived: the defendants 
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Although the litigation process began in 1996, the stage for 
seeking the return of assets from Switzerland was set the preceding 
year.137 Researchers for the World Jewish Congress (“WJC”) 
informed Edgar Bronfman Sr., former head of the WJC, about the 
dormant Swiss bank accounts.138 Soon thereafter in 1996, US Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato began holding hearings before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.139 Popular media began to 
publish the story and portrayed the Swiss negatively in books and 
newspaper articles.140 The Swiss struggled to respond, but a May 
                                                                                                             
agreed to forgo dispositive legal and factual defenses; (3) Revival of Claims: the settlement 
protected class members whose claims may otherwise have expired under applicable statutes 
of limitation and repose; (4) Distribution: the settlement did not preordain a distribution plan. 
It merely required a “fair and open mechanism” to determine criteria pursuant to distribution 
and allocation determination that were subsequently made; (5) Settled Claims: settling class 
members and plaintiffs agreed to “irrevocably and unconditionally” release, discharge and 
acquit any claims related to the Holocaust, World War II, its prelude or aftermath, and more; 
(6): Class Beneficiaries: the parties agreed that the settlement should benefit those deemed to 
have been targets of systematic Nazi oppression on the basis of religion, race, or personal 
status. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (discussing the 
settlement agreement). 
137. See HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation 
and the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); Roger 
Witten, How Swiss Banks and German Companies Came to Terms with the Wrenching 
Legacies of the Holocaust and World War II: A Defense Perspective, in HOLOCAUST 
RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 81 (Michael J. Bazyler & 
Roger Alford eds. 2006) (explaining the World Jewish Congress’ (“WJC”) involvement in 
bringing claims against Swiss Banks). 
138. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); see 
generally Edgar Bronfman & Israel Singer, Foreword in THE PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY 
DURING THE HOLOCAUST at viii (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (illustrating the WJC’s role in the 
resurgence of Holocaust-era memory and the vast Holocaust-era litigation in the 1990s). Many 
scholars are skeptical about the WJC’s involvement in the Holocaust Restitution process and 
claim that the organization was looking for something to keep their mission relevant. 
Holocaust restitution then became the new driving force behind the WJC, maintaining its 
relevance and prestige. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 56 (“The WJC needed a niche to make 
itself distinctive among the pantheon of Jewish organizations.”); MARRUS, supra note 5, at 83 
(describing Bronfman’s reasons for getting involved in the Holocaust restitution process). 
139. See e.g., Swiss Banks and Attempts to Recover Assets Belonging to the Victims of 
the Holocaust: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th 
Cong. 1-3 (1997) (statement of Sen. Alfonse D’Amato, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs) (engaging in the first session on the inquiry into the assets of the 
Holocaust victims deposited in Swiss Banks and the issues surrounding the recovery and 
restoration of gold and other assets looted by Nazi Germany during World War II, and the acts 
of restitution which must follow); see HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the 
Swiss Banks litigation and the history leading up to the class action litigation). 
140. See HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the media storm 
surrounding the Swiss Banks litigation); Edgar Bronfman & Israel Singer, Foreword to THE 
PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST at viii (Avi Beker ed., 2001) 
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1997 report issued by the US government, which had been looking 
into Switzerland’s activities during the war through its own archived 
documents, further damaged Switzerland’s public image and 
Holocaust narrative.141 The Report became known as the First 
Eizenstat Report for Stuart Eizenstat, the Assistant Secretary of State 
who had been selected by President Bill Clinton to head a 
commission on the issue.142 The report provided extensive details 
about Swiss wartime profiteering, which continued into the postwar 
period when Switzerland kept more than half of looted assets and 
stonewalled the return of assets in accordance with the Washington 
Accord.143 The 1946 Washington Accord was an agreement between 
the United States and Switzerland.144 In the Accord, the Swiss agreed 
to return US$58 million in looted gold and promised to contribute 
CHF50 million to a reparations fund created by the Allies for 
resettlement and relief for refugees.145 In return, their frozen assets in 
the United States were returned and they won the right to keep half of 
the liquidated German assets.146 
In response to the First Eizenstat Report and the growing 
international pressure, the Swiss Bankers’ Association, a trade 
organization comprised of Swiss banks, created the Independent 
Committee of Eminent Persons (“ICEP”) and persuaded Paul 
Volcker, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, to 
                                                                                                             
(illustrating the WJC’s role in the resurgence of Holocaust-era memory and the role of the 
media in creating interest in the resurgence). 
141. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); Beker, 
supra note 5, at 142-43 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (discussing the rise of the Swiss Banks litigation 
and the process by which plaintiffs’ lawyers and survivors fought for restitution). 
142. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); Avi 
Becker, Why was Switzerland Singled Out? A Case of Belated Justice, in THE PLUNDER OF 
JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST 142-43 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (discussing the rise 
of the Swiss Banks litigation and the process by which plaintiffs’ lawyers and survivors fought 
for restitution). 
143. See HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation 
and the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); Roger 
Witten, supra note 137 (describing the Swiss perspective on how and why they approached the 
litigation the way they did). 
144. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 106 (describing the Washington Accord and its 
affect on interactions with the Swiss in the 1990s); Roger Alford, The Claims Resolution 
Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks, 20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 212, 252 (2002) 
(discussing the Washington Agreement of 1946 as obligating the Swiss to assist the Allies in 
identifying heirless assets). 
145. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 106.  
146. Id.  
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lead the committee.147 Then, in December 1996, the Swiss created a 
six-person historical commission to investigate Switzerland’s 
Holocaust-era actions.148 However, by this time the Swiss bank 
litigation was already underway and the Swiss would have to face the 
class action lawsuit, which some have deemed to be the most 
effective weapon in enduring resolution of Holocaust-era claims.149 
The US government was involved in the Swiss Bank litigation in 
a limited capacity by issuing the First Eizenstat report and pushing for 
the creation of Swiss historical commissions.150 However, this 
influence was limited because ultimately the focal point for restitution 
became the class action rather than political negotiations.151 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys understood the importance of implementing the class action 
mechanism as a tool.152 Thus, the class action mechanism can be seen 
as strategic either as (1) a threat in order to facilitate a quicker 
settlement resolution, (2) an actual litigation strategy that they 
pursued until a final class settlement, or (3) a bargaining chip at 
longstanding negotiation tables.153   
                                                                                                             
147. Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing Volcker’s involvement and acceptance of the role as 
Committee chairman); HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the Swiss Banks 
litigation and the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era 
litigation); Witten, supra note 137, at 82 (describing the two investigative processes 
established to analyze Swiss involvement in the war). 
148. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); Witten, 
supra note 137, at 81-82 (discussing the effectiveness of the historical commissions 
established by the Swiss). 
149. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); see also 
Witten, supra note 137, at 84 (discussing the futility of the historical commissions and 
negotiations). 
150.  HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation 
and the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); see 
also Witten, supra note 137, at 84 (discussing the futility of the historical commissions and 
negotiations). 
151. HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the Swiss Banks litigation and 
the history leading up to it along with the other prominent Holocaust-era litigation); see also 
Witten, supra note 137, at 84 (discussing the futility of the historical commissions and 
negotiations). 
152. See Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan 
(May 16, 2014) (describing the effectiveness of the class action mechanism); Interview with 
Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center (Mar. 17, 2014) (comparing the 
Swiss litigation process to the Austrian and German settlement processes). 
153. See e.g., In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F.Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(demonstrating the class action settlement accomplished as a result of pursuing the class action 
mechanism for resolution of historical injustices); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust 
160 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
B. Austrian Banks Litigation: Negotiation with Limited Court 
Involvement 
In October 1998, claims against Creditanstalt AG 
(“Creditanstalt”) and its parent bank, Austria AG (“Bank Austria”), 
were amended to a pending class action against German banks in the 
US District Court for the Southern District of New York.154 Plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants, including Bank Austria and Creditanstalt 
(collectively, “the Austrian Banks”), and Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank, Commerzbank, and Hypo Bank (collectively, “the German 
Banks”), had violated international law and committed various torts 
as a result of Nazi activities during and after World War II.155 The 
actions were transferred to the purview of the Honorable Judge Kram 
in the Southern District of New York, who in December 1998 
appointed former Senator Alfonse D’Amato as Special Master to 
work with the parties to reach a settlement.156 In March 1999, the 
plaintiffs officially filed a consolidated class action complaint.157 
Plaintiffs alleged that the Austrian and German Banks profited from 
forced and slave labor, and converted assets from those persecuted by 
the Nazis.158 Along with his colleague Viet Dihn, the Special Master 
worked with the various parties for months to negotiate a 
                                                                                                             
Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (providing an example of a class action suit 
pursued, whose threat pushed the parties to the negotiating table); In re Austrian, German 
Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (providing an example of a class action litigation 
dealing with Austrian and German slave labor that was dismissed because of negotiations 
where the threat of the class action was used when negotiating the international agreement). 
154. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (describing 
the class consolidation and background to the case); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 
238-40 (describing the claims filed prior to consolidation as In re Austrian & German Bank 
Holocaust Litig.). 
155. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (discussing 
plaintiffs’ complaint); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 238 (describing the claims 
against the Austrian Banks for profiting from slave labor, participating in, and profiting from 
looting, also known as “Aryanization” of Jewish property). 
156. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (describing 
the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the settlement reached); Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 48, at 240 (discussing D’Amato’s duties as Special Master). 
157. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (describing 
the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the settlement reached); Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 48, at 240 (discussing the consolidation of the class). 
158. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (describing 
the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the settlement reached); Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 48, at 239 (explaining the different claims raised against the Banks). 
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settlement.159 The two Austrian Banks reached a separate settlement 
with the plaintiffs’ attorneys in March 1999.160 The settlement 
became the third out-of-court settlement reached in modern 
Holocaust-era litigation.161 However, it garnered some negative media 
attention because the settlement amount of US$40 million was 
relatively small and a fourth of the settlement was allocated to 
administrative expenses and attorneys’ fees, leaving only a negligible 
amount for survivors.162 
Newspapers around the world published notice in September 
1999 announcing the proposed class action settlement against the 
Austrian Banks.163 Notice included:  
(1) the key terms of the settlement, (2) how to obtain a claim 
form, (3) that members of the Settlement Class would be bound 
by the Settlement if they did not inform class counsel that they 
wished to opt-out by October 18, 1999, and (4) that members of 
the Settlement Class were permitted to comment on or object to 
the Settlement in writing and at the Fairness Hearing so long as 
written objections were received by the Court post-marked no 
later than October 18, 1999.164 
Like the notice issued in the Swiss Banks litigation, the court utilized 
varied modes of notice so as to reach the widely dispersed class 
                                                                                                             
159. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69 
(describing the class action settlement and analyzing the fairness of the settlement reached); 
Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan (May 16, 
2014) (discussing the engagement of a Special Master and his advisor in the Austrian Banks 
litigation). 
160. Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan 
(May 16, 2014) (discussing Moerdler’s insistence on settling the claims as quickly and 
efficiently as possible as prerequisite for taking the case); Nuremberg in America, supra note 
48, at 240 (discussing the process of reaching a settlement). 
161. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 240-41 (describing the settlement and the 
controversy surrounding the relatively small amount of money actually allocated to survivors); 
Ratner, supra note 68, at n.5 (discussing the exceptions to the Austrian international 
agreements, including the Austrian Banks litigation). 
162. See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 124-25 (describing how Judge Kram sanctioned 
Fagan, one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, who was later disbarred for his “wrongdoing in a 
multibillion-dollar Holocaust-related lawsuit”); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 242 
(discussing the US$40 million settlement paid by the Austrian Banks). 
163. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (describing 
the court’s order of certification and the notice requirements); Nuremberg in America, supra 
note 48, at 241 (discussing the notice process). 
164. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (discussing 
notice requirements and notice process); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 241 
describing the court’s notice requirements). 
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members.165 A fairness hearing was held in November 1999 and 
Judge Kram approved the settlement in January 2000.166 The 
settlement was eventually accepted and the funds were distributed 
without extensive bureaucratic interference or controversy.167 The 
involvement of the court in the settlement negotiation process was far 
more limited than it had been in the Swiss Banks litigation.168 After 
witnessing the media storm, the political backlash and the massive 
litigation that the Swiss Banks endured, the Austrian Banks and 
Austrian government sought an alternative to the Swiss Banks 
approach.169 
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN HOLOCAUST 
RESTITUTION: APPLYING INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
This Section will analyze the international agreements 
mechanism and its application in the Austrian negotiations.170 Part 
III.A. will situate the analysis of international agreements through the 
                                                                                                             
165. See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 169 
(describing the modes of notice including paid newspaper advertisements in countries with 
large survivor populations, direct mailings to organizations and individuals, promotional 
announcements in key cities around the world, and the creation of a “homepage” on the web); 
see also In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, at 144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (describing the notice plan and elements of notice required by the court for proper Rule 
23 process). 
166. See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 169-71 
(describing the settlement fund and the fairness hearing); Nuremberg in America, supra note 
48, at 241-42 (discussing the court’s fairness hearing and eventual acceptance of the proposed 
settlement). 
167. See Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan 
(May 16, 2014) (explaining that there were funds left over once the period for distribution 
ended and that Judge Kram allocated the residual to a charity in Manhattan); Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 48, at 241-42 (describing the approval of the settlement by Judge Kram 
on January 10, 2000). 
168. Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan 
(May 16, 2014) (discussing the negotiations between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys in 
reaching a settlement); see Ratner, supra note 67, at 225 (discussing an alternative to the class 
action mechanism through executive agreement whereby court involvement in settlement 
would be limited). 
169. Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan 
(May 16, 2014) (describing Bank Austria’s fear of massive litigation and acceptance of a quick 
settlement process); Ratner, supra note 68, at 226 (discussing the German negotiation process 
as the alternative to the Swiss Banks litigation). 
170. See infra Part III.A. (describing the Austrian negotiations); infra Part III.B. 
(discussing the potential application of international restitution in the International Court of 
Justice). 
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Austrian negotiations and Part III.B. will analyze potentially 
applicable international principles on restitution. 
A. The Austrian Negotiations: Application of the International 
Agreements 
While class actions certify a class, negotiate a settlement, and 
obtain a class-wide judgment, international agreements lead to limited 
“legal peace.”171 The United States filed Statements of Interest for 
legal proceedings involving Holocaust-era claims and, in exchange, 
the Austrian government established two compensation funds, the 
General Settlement Fund (“GSF”) and the Reconciliation, Peace and 
Cooperation Fund (“Reconciliation Fund”).172 Additionally, 
provisions were put in place to require legal change in Austria 
pursuant to the establishment and implementation of the GSF.173 
As a result of the litigation in the 1990s, the US government 
became involved in the negotiation of international agreements 
between the Holocaust claimants and a number of foreign States.174 In 
                                                                                                             
171. Ratner, supra note 68, at 226 (describing how the Executive Agreement acted as an 
alternative to litigation); see also Nuremberg in America, supra note, 48 at n.817 (discussing 
the use of Statements of Interest in the German legal proceedings). “Legal peace” is the term 
used in the General Settlement Fund agreements to allude to the completion of all Holocaust 
related claims, covered by the agreement. See Joint Statement and Exchange of Notes Between 
the United States and Austria Concerning the Establishment of the General Settlement Fund 
for Nazi-Era and World War II Claims, Austria-U.S., Jan. 17, 2001, published in 40 I.L.M. 
565 (2001) [hereinafter GSF Agreement] (providing the Joint Statement, Exchange of Notes 
and Annexes A-C). 
172. See generally GSF Agreement, supra note 171 (providing the Joint Statement, 
Exchange of Notes and Annexes A-C); Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Austrian Federal Government Concerning the Austrian Fund 
“Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation” (Reconciliation Fund), Austria-U.S., Oct. 24, 2000, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/129563.pdf [hereinafter  
Reconciliation Fund Agreement] (providing for the establishment of the Reconciliation Fund 
to compensate slave and forced laborers). 
173. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 567 ¶ a (providing “Austria will propose 
the necessary legislation to establish the General Settlement Fund in conformity with the 
principles set forth in Annex A”); Reconciliation Fund, supra note 172 (providing in Annex A 
the “Principles Governing the Operation of the Fund” including the legislation governing the 
fund). 
174. The Executive Agreements entailed meetings on regular and alternating bases in the 
host country (Austria, Germany, or France) and the United States. Participants included 
representatives from the host country, the United States, Israel, the World Jewish Restitution 
Organization, plaintiffs’ counsel, several Central and Eastern European countries (in the case 
of the German negotiations), and, depending on the case, representatives from private 
industries for companies that were potential defendants in litigation occurring in the United 
States. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (describing the process of Executive Agreement 
negotiation between the Unites and Austria, Germany, or France); see also Interview with 
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order to best describe the application of this mechanism, it must be 
placed within the context of the Holocaust-era discussions.175 
President Clinton appointed Stuart Eizenstat for the US government 
as the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.176 Eizenstat dealt 
specifically with “encourag[ing] the return of property confiscated . . 
. by the Nazis . . . concentrat[ing] primarily on the Jewish 
communities facing the greatest barriers.”177 Eizenstat’s role was to 
resolve political problems, and as such acted as a mediator.178 
Negotiations were framed as an alternative to the Rule 23 class action 
settlements and became the preferred method of settlement after the 
Swiss Bank litigation settlement of the late 1990s.179 One of the 
results of the international agreements was that the United States filed 
Statements of Interest in the legal proceedings that involved Nazi-era 
claims.180 Thus, instead of certifying a settlement class and receiving 
a class-wide judgment with release in exchange for payments made 
by the settling defendants, the defendants would sign a joint statement 
with the United States and all parties involved in the negotiation, 
which would stand as the “exclusive remedy and forum for the 
resolution of all claims” against that particular country.181 
                                                                                                             
Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing 
Mendelsohn’s involvement in orchestrating agreements between the United States and a 
number of Central and Eastern European countries). 
175. The application of this method will further be explained in infra Part III.B.2. 
176. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing Eizenstat’s appointment as Special 
Envoy); see also Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (explaining the American representative in 
negotiations with foreign countries for Executive Agreements). 
177. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing Eizenstat’s appointment as Special 
Envoy); see also Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (explaining the American representative in 
negotiations with foreign countries for Executive Agreements). 
178. Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (discussing the failings of the Executive Agreements 
process); see generally Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal 
Center (Mar. 17, 2014) (describing some of Eizenstat’s failings as a mediator in negotiating 
the Executive Agreements). 
179. Ratner, supra note 68, at 226 (describing the Executive Agreements as an 
alternative mechanism to the class action); see supra Swiss Banks litigation, at Part I.B. 
180. Ratner, supra note 67, at 226; see October 24, 2000 Executive Agreement between 
the Government of the United States and the Austrian Federal Government, 
http://reconciliationfund.at/index-2.html; Statement of Interest of the United States, In re 
Austrian and German Bank Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff’d sub. nom., 
D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 98-3938) (describing the 
American statement in the Austrian and German Banks litigation as a result of the Executive 
Agreement). 
181. Ratner, supra note 68, at 226 (describing the Executive Agreement with Germany 
entitled “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”); see also EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 
214 (discussing the German agreement and the different funds established as a result of the 
agreement). 
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It is important to note that Mr. Eizenstat neither acted in a 
judicial capacity, nor evaluated the class action cases as litigation.182 
Due to his longstanding government career and his relationship with 
the Clinton Administration, Mr. Eizenstat understood his role in the 
negotiations as dealing with “a political problem.”183 Yet he 
orchestrated a negotiation that allowed for resolution of slave labor 
litigation, property disputes, and even looted art in States across 
Europe.184 
Interestingly, the Joint Statement for the GSF frames the 
discussion of the fund similar to the class action requirements.185 For 
example, the parties declare that “based on the circumstances, the 
participants consider the overall result fair to the victims and their 
heirs.”186 They also declare that given the advanced age of survivors 
at the time, “the primary humanitarian objective of the provision of 
immediate compensation for survivors . . . [is] a cooperative, fair 
and non-bureaucratic manner to ensure that payments reach the 
victims quickly.”187 The GSF required a “good faith” effort to 
implement the measures described in the Annex to the Joint Statement 
                                                                                                             
182. Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (outlining the limitations of Eizenstat’s role in the 
negotiation processes); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal 
Center, in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (describing Eizenstat’s limitations in the negotiation 
process and some of the failings that limitation led to). 
183. One particularly problematic example involves the settlement against Germany. 
The US government promoted a 10 billion DM (about US$4.5 billion) settlement with half 
paid by German industry and the other half paid by the Germany government. This amount 
was never suggested by plaintiffs’ counsel and had no relationship to plaintiffs’ claims. Once 
Mr. Eizenstat put his support behind the number during settlement discussions, the amount 
became first a ceiling that did not allow for further discussion about the true property value of 
the claims. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (providing an understanding of how viewing the 
negotiations from a political perspective hampered the process). Interview with Martin 
Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) 
(describing how plaintiffs received less compensation because of Eizenstat’s insistence on 
supporting certain measures); Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (discussing the German fund 
payouts as an example of Eizenstat’s limitation as a mediator). 
184. See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 293-314 (discussing Eizenstat’s role in 
negotiating settlements and agreements concerning Holocaust assets). But see Ratner, supra 
note 68, at 225 (describing the limits of Eizenstat’s role as a government official). 
185. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the class action mechanism). 
186. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 566 ¶ 1, 2 (describing fairness evaluations 
when creating, negotiating, and managing the Fund); see FED. R. CIV. P 23(b)(3), supra note 
74 (describing the fairness evaluations in the class action mechanism). See also Reconciliation 
Fund, supra note 172, at 2 (“Believing that the Fund will provide as expeditious as possible a 
mechanism for making fair and speedy payment to now elderly victims.”) and at Annex B, ¶ 8 
(providing that “[the] Fund is fair and equitable based on. . . .” a number of criteria including 
the age of survivors, the level of funding and more). 
187. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 566. 
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and also required that Austria fund in advance “appropriate publicity 
concerning the establishment of the General Settlement Fund.”188 
The Austrian government became involved in negotiations with 
Mr. Eizenstat, plaintiffs’ counsel, multinational corporations, and the 
Jewish community of Austria.189 These discussions concerned a 
myriad of issues including slave or forced labor payments, looted 
assets, and individual and communal property.190 Although the 
negotiations that led to the international agreement with Austria were 
initially focused on slave labor issues, Mr. Eizenstat took the slave 
labor negotiations as an opportunity to settle property claims as 
well.191 Acting as an intermediary, Mr. Eizenstat began negotiations 
with the Austrian government, represented by Ernst Sucharipa; the 
dean of the Austrian Diplomatic Academy, Hannah Lessing; the head 
of the Austrian National Fund, which had been providing funds to 
Austrian Holocaust survivors since 1995; and Ariel Muzicant, the 
head of the Austrian Jewish community.192 These negotiations led to 
“bitter battles” that would ultimately complicate not only the property 
claims but the labor negotiations as well.193 Personalities clashed 
                                                                                                             
188. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 56 ¶ e (describing the requirement to 
publicize the establishment of the fund); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), supra note 75 
(discussing notice requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See also 
Reconciliation Fund, supra note 172, at 3 (providing “Austria agrees to ensure that the Fund 
shall provide appropriately extensive publicity concerning its existence, its objectives and the 
availability of funds”). 
189. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 279-92 (describing the negotiation process in 
Austria); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the Austrian Jewish Community, in New 
York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing Mr. Muzicant’s involvement in the Executive Agreement 
negotiations with the US and Austrian governments). 
190. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 287-290 (describing the variety of claims being 
negotiated).  
191. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 289 (describing the property claim dispute and 
Eizenstat’s involvement in the negotiations); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the 
Austrian Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (describing how negotiations 
only began when the new government with Chancellor Schuessel was formed). 
192. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 291 (describing the various parties at the 
negotiating table); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the Austrian Jewish Community, in 
New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing Muzicant’s involvement in the negotiations and 
why he saw the property disputes as integral for the longevity of the Austrian Jewish 
Community as a way of “righting wrongs” and as a way of really representing Jewish 
interests); Cf. Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 195-96 (describing the German 
government’s fear of litigation as a factor for entering negotiations on slave labor disputes). 
193. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 292 (explaining, from Eizenstat’s perspective, 
Muzicant’s biases, personality, and distrust of many of those involved in the negotiations, 
including the Austrian government and some of the plaintiffs’ lawyers); Interview with Ariel 
Muzicant, head of the Austrian Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) 
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during the negotiations and while Eizenstat was looking for a quick 
resolution to the negotiations, other parties focused on more 
substantive issues and drew out the negotiation process.194 Mr. 
Eizenstat met with Chancellor Schuessel, Mr. Muzicant, and 
plaintiffs’ counsel who had filed claims in the United States involving 
the Austrian government or Austrian corporations.195 The Jewish 
community wanted a number of concessions including the right to 
pursue Jewish communal property claims, a lump sum to support the 
community, and Austrian maintenance of “known and unknown” 
cemeteries.196 The GSF provided that the Jewish communal 
organizations, including the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (“IKG”), 
represented by Muzicant, would be eligible for restitution in rem for 
“losses of immovable and tangible moveable property (e.g., cultural 
or religious items)” provided that they meet a number of criteria.197 
The IKG would have to satisfy the following: (1) that all property be 
“publically-owned,” as defined by the text of the agreement, and (2) 
                                                                                                             
(describing Eizenstat’s insistence on resolving the negotiations quickly and acting in the 
interests of the Claims Conference rather than in the interests of all parties). 
194. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 292 (explaining, from Eizenstat’s perspective, 
Muzicant’s issues and the ways in which his personality clashed with others involved in the 
negotiations); Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner at Stroock, Stroock & 
Levan (May 16, 2014) (discussing the ways in which Eizenstat clashed with others present at 
the negotiations). 
195. These meetings were often held as large group discussions in Austria, where 
Chancellor Schuessel was represented by Mr. Sucharipa. Some of the lawyers present at these 
meetings included Martin Mendelsohn, who represented a number of Eastern European 
governments, Michael Hausfeld, who represented individual claimants from the United States, 
Edward Fagan (later involved in a malpractice suit and disbarred), who represented some of 
the US claimants, Randol Schoenberg, who represented Maria Altmann’s claims for the return 
of Klimts, and Charles Moerdler, who represented the Austrian Jewish community. See 
EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 302-13 (describing the tense negotiations that involved the 
Austrian government and the lawyers); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the Austrian 
Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing his reservations with the 
negotiation process); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, 
in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing his involvement in the negotiations); Telephone 
Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner at Stroock, Stroock & Levan (May 16, 2014) 
(describing the tense relationship between him and Eizenstat). 
196. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 310-12 (discussing the concessions made to the 
Austrian Jewish community); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the Austrian Jewish 
Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (describing the various issues the community 
viewed as integral to a viable settlement). 
197. GSF Agreement , supra note 171, at 576 (discussing generally the parameters for 
restitution of property to the Austrian Jewish community); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, 
head of the Austrian Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing the 
process by which the Austrian Jewish community and specifically the IKG negotiated for the 
return of property as well as compensation in a lump sum). 
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that the property was owned by the Jewish communal organization, or 
for defunct groups by its legal predecessor, at the time of the loss, and 
(3) the claims were not previously decided or settled or no 
consideration or compensation had been received for the property 
except where there was a unanimous decision by the GSF that the 
compensation constituted “extreme injustice,” or (4) that the claim 
was denied for a failure to produce evidence under prior legislation in 
cases where the evidence was once inaccessible but had since become 
accessible.198 
Eventually, all parties signed the agreement, closing the chapter 
on Holocaust restitution in Austria for many survivors, but allowing 
the process to continue for others.199 The final settlement allowed 
Randol Schoenberg, Maria Altmann’s attorney, to file a claim in the 
United States and pursue the return of Ms. Altmann’s Klimt 
paintings.200 The Joint Statement to the GSF notes that the US$210 
million made available by Austria and Austrian companies would act 
as both a ceiling and a final amount for all compensation and 
restitution concerning Austria.201 However, the Joint Statement 
acknowledged that two types of claims were excluded from the GSF 
parameters: (1) all those claims covered by the Reconciliation Fund 
and (2) any “in rem claims for works of art.”202 Thus, while all 
subsequent claims against the Austrian government and companies 
                                                                                                             
198. GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 576 (describing the criteria for the Jewish 
community to claim restitution of property); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, head of the 
Austrian Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (describing the inadequacy of 
the GSF with regards to its consideration of Jewish communal needs). 
199. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 313-14 (describing the tension in the signature process 
when the Austrian Jewish community seemed to “hijack the negotiations” because they did not 
believe the community would receive adequate compensation); Interview with Ariel Muzicant, 
head of the Austrian Jewish Community, in New York, NY (Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing the 
inadequacies of the settlement because they did not entail lump sum payments to sustain the 
Austrian Jewish community). 
200. See supra note 4 (describing Maria Altmann’s journey for the return of her 
property); supra note 8 (discussing Altmann’s litigation process). 
201. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 566; Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, 
Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (placing limits on the 
fund, including the amount to be distributed); Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, 
Partner at Stroock, Stroock & Levan (May 16, 2014) (describing the distribution of the GSF 
Fund as incredibly fair but that it took years to give out the payments). 
202. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 566 (discussing the limitations in scope of 
the GSF Fund); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in 
New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing Randol Schoenberg’s involvement in the GSF 
negotiations and his request that works of art not be covered by the Fund). 
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closed as a result of the agreements, looted art cases became the last 
available avenue for Holocaust restitution.203 
The negotiations facilitated a resolution for many different 
parties dealing with varied issues across vast geographic borders.204 
The settlement resolved many of the claims filed against the Austrian 
government in the United States and allowed for quick distribution of 
funds in an effective and timely manner.205 By contrast, the Swiss 
Bank litigation took much longer to resolve and there were litigation 
matters pending for more than a decade, including the allocation of 
funds from certain settlement classes.206 However, the negotiations 
were limited by the politics involved in settling the dispute as an 
international negotiation, and by the lack of an impartial judge 
assessing the settlement.207 
                                                                                                             
203. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 566 (discussing the limitations in scope of 
the GSF Fund); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in 
New York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing Randol Schoenberg’s involvement in the GSF 
negotiations and his request that works of art not be covered by the Fund). 
204. See GSF Agreement, supra note 171, art. n (providing compensation and property 
allowance for the IKG); Reconciliation Fund, supra note 172, at ¶ 15, at 4 (Principles 
Governing the Operation of the Fund) (providing “[t]he Reconciliation Fund legislation will 
enter into force no later than when the funds of the Fund are made available to it and the 
bilateral agreements between Austria and the Governments of Belarus, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have been signed”). 
205. Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center (Mar. 17, 
2014) (discussing his quick implementation, distribution, and completion of the Austria 
Reconciliation Fund); see generally AUSTRIAN RECONCILIATION FUND, http://reconciliation 
fund.at/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (describing the Fund and providing a history of both the 
Fund and the Austrian restitution process). See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 314 (describing 
the participants’ happiness at the resolution of the negotiations, including Schoenberg who 
would later litigate Altmann’s looted art case in the United States). 
206. See generally In re Holocaust Victims Litig., No. 14-CV-00890 ERK JO, 2014 WL 
2547582 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014) (pertaining to a request received by the court from the 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany for “approval of the budget for the 
vital humanitarian services to be provided in 2014 from funds allocated to the neediest victims 
of Nazi persecution from the Swiss Banks Settlement Fund”); In re Holocaust Victims Assets 
Litig., No. 14-CV-00890 ERK JO, 2014 WL 2171144 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (pertaining to 
a request received by the court from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 
“approval of the budget for the vital humanitarian services to be provided in 2014 from funds 
allocated for the neediest victims of Nazi persecution from the Swiss Banks Settlement 
Fund”); Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing the efficiency of the Austrian negotiations and 
distribution of funds as compared to other negotiation and litigation processes). 
207. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (describing the differences between the Swiss 
Banks litigation and the Executive Agreements); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 70-
71 (discussing the Swiss Banks settlement and Judge Korman’s intimate involvement in the 
settlement process). For more on the politics involved in negotiations, see generally 
EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 293-314 (describing the politics involved in settling the 
negotiations including Eizenstat’s need to verify with the White House, to discuss settlement 
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B. International Principles: Possible Contemporary Solutions 
Another important avenue for engagement in creating and 
supporting restitution movements could be through international 
mechanisms and courts.208 The International Law Commission in the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(“ILC Articles”) codifies wrongful conduct by States.209 Article 31 of 
the ILC Articles provides for full reparations for material injury or 
damage caused by a State’s wrongful act.210 The International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”) confirmed the application of this article in the 
LaGrand case, demonstrating the power international courts have to 
afford remedies, even when the treaty providing such remedies does 
not explicitly give the court such power.211 Furthermore, Article 33 of 
the ILC Articles provides that the articles are without prejudice to 
“any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, 
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a 
State.”212 In his article “Lost and Regained,” Antoine Buyse argues 
                                                                                                             
options with the Claims Conference, and the involvement of the WJC); Ratner, supra note 65, 
at 225 (describing Eizenstat’s involvement as “resolv[ing] what he viewed, at least in part, as a 
political problem”). 
208. See Antoine Buyse, Lost and Regained?: Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights 
Violations in the Context of International Law, HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (2008) 
(describing various forms of international legal engagement for responding to violations of 
international law and the remedies to those violations); see generally Report of the 
International Law Commission, fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/589 (discussing state 
responsibility for internationally prohibited acts). 
209. See U.N. Doc. A/56/589, supra note 208, at 5-11.  
210. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 130 (describing various forms of international legal 
engagement for responding to violations of international law and the remedies to those 
violations). See generally Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third session, UN 
Doc. A/56/589, art. 31 (providing that a state must “make full reparation for the injury caused 
by the internationally wrongful act”). The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) 
has recognized this tenant in the Chorzów Factory case. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 130 
(discussing the foundation for reparations under international law). See generally Chorzów 
Factory (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26, 1927) (recognizing 
international remedies for violations of international wrongful acts). See also UN Doc. 
A/56/10, Ch. II (discussing reparations and restitution, spelling out in further detail the general 
principle stated in article 31 and establishing the differences between various forms of 
reparations like restitution, compensation, and satisfaction). 
211. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 130 (discussing the basis for international legal 
remedies and application through international courts). See generally LaGrand Case (Germany 
v. United States of America) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, 466 (finding that an international 
remedy could be provided for individuals). 
212. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 134 (discussing the application of restitution within 
the context of human rights law); Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third 
session, UN Doc. A/56/589, art. 33 (providing that “[t]his Part is without prejudice to any 
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that there is a possibility for human rights treaties to apply to 
individuals and that State responsibility can be invoked by individuals 
at an international level.213 Buyse further contends that there are 
arguments to be made for extending state responsibility rules to 
individuals.214 He argues that the ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion, 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
found that the United Nations, a non-state entity, had the right to 
claims reparations at an international level from a State.215 As such, 
individuals could also be recognized as subjects of international law 
and could thus have the possibility to claim reparations at an 
international level.216 
                                                                                                             
right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any 
person or entity other than a State”). 
213. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 134 (describing the application of international law 
for violations of individual human rights). But see Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparations for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, IRRC 529, 530 (2003) (describing that “with 
regard to individual victims of violations of human rights law and international humanitarian 
law the position remains more uncertain”). 
214. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 135 (arguing that “This argument starts with three 
basic assumptions. The first is the general principle that every violation of a substantive rule of 
international law requires a remedy. The second is that states are under a general obligation to 
respect and ensure human rights. The third is that individuals, as stated in the previous 
paragraph, are the main beneficiaries towards which the duty of human rights observance is 
owed. If one accepts these three assumptions, there can be no other logical conclusion than the 
following: individuals should have a right to reparation applying the ILC Articles by 
analogy”). See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (discussing “whether the sum of the 
international rights of the Organization comprises the right to bring an international claim to 
obtain reparation from a State in respect of the damage caused by the injury of an agent of the 
Organization in the course of the performance of his duties”). 
215. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 135 (arguing that “This argument starts with three 
basic assumptions. The first is the general principle that every violation of a substantive rule of 
international law requires a remedy. The second is that states are under a general obligation to 
respect and ensure human rights. The third is that individuals, as stated in the previous 
paragraph, are the main beneficiaries towards which the duty of human rights observance is 
owed. If one accepts these three assumptions, there can be no other logical conclusion than the 
following: individuals should have a right to reparation applying the ILC Articles by 
analogy”). See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (discussing “whether the sum of the 
international rights of the Organization comprises the right to bring an international claim to 
obtain reparation from a State in respect of the damage caused by the injury of an agent of the 
Organization in the course of the performance of his duties”). 
216. See generally 1949 I.C.J. 8 (discussing “whether the sum of the international rights 
of the Organization comprises the right to bring an international claim to obtain reparation 
from a State in respect of the damage caused by the injury of an agent of the Organization in 
the course of the performance of his duties”). 
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IV. A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE: ACCESSING THE 
INTERNATIONAL REALM 
This Section will discuss the various applications of the 
Holocaust restitution processes to subsequent violations and the 
importance of strategizing based on the community’s needs.217 Part 
IV.A. will discuss which process was more successful: class action or 
international agreement. Part IV.B. will describe the limitations of 
impact litigation through the Khulumani case and Part IV.C. will 
discuss how the Holocaust Restitution Movement can act as a rubric 
for subsequent movement building for survivors of other genocide 
and mass human rights violations. Part IV.C.1 will discuss the 
Cambodian genocide and Part IV.C.2 will discuss the Armenian 
genocide. 
A. Finding Success: A Combination of Multiple Strategies 
Although there are many important strategies to be learned from 
the Holocaust Restitution Movement, the most successful path would 
incorporate the domestic strategies outlined by the Movement, like 
class action lawsuits and welfare based strategies, and incorporate 
stronger elements of engaging international law and international 
courts.218 This Note has documented a particular historical moment 
and the legal principles that formed a movement; however, the 
strategies are not restricted to Holocaust restitution.219 Just as the 
Holocaust movement of the 1990s was a sophisticated and 
multipronged project, so too must be any restitution movement 
endeavoring to achieve recognition, social, and legal success.220 
The Holocaust Restitution Movement successfully made use of 
US domestic litigation mechanisms and political negotiations.221 The 
class action mechanism served the plaintiffs well, providing huge 
                                                                                                             
217. See infra Part IV.A. (assessing which was more successful, the negotiations or 
litigation); see infra Part IV.B. (describing a case where class action mechanisms were applied 
unsuccessfully in a subsequent case); see infra Part IV.C. (discussing two particular examples 
where application can be useful). 
218. See supra Parts I and II (describing the importance of combining strategies for a 
successful movement). 
219. See infra Part III.C. (discussing the application of Holocaust restitution strategies to 
subsequent movement building). 
220. See supra note 6 (discussing Altmann’s implementation of multiple strategies 
before resolution of her claims); infra Party IV.C. (discussing the application of Holocaust 
restitution strategies to subsequent restitution movements). 
221. See supra Part II. 
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class payouts and widespread media attention.222 By employing an 
impartial judge to assess the fairness of the settlement, the litigation 
proceedings demonstrated clearer and better-articulated settlement 
classes and overall fairness.223 However, although the class action 
reached a quicker settlement, subsequent proceedings dragged on well 
past a decade after the initial pleadings were filed.224 Additionally, 
due to the scope of the class, survivors only received nominal 
compensation.225 Although litigation typically takes longer to reach 
resolution, that can be considered one of the fallbacks with regards to 
engaging only with litigation mechanisms.226 
By contrast, the political negotiations were mired with 
politicking, tension, and big personalities who vied not only for the 
best settlement for their clients but also for personal attention.227 
Despite this, the negotiations were resolved more efficiently, funds 
were allocated more effectively, and a myriad of issues were resolved, 
like individual property returns, forced labor wages, and communal 
claims.228 The class action litigation focused solely on the Swiss 
Banks.229 While there were clear benefits and detriments to each 
                                                                                                             
222. See Beker, supra note 5, at 145-46 (Avi Beker ed., 2001) (discussing the use of 
class actions for plaintiffs); Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing why the 
Swiss Banks litigation was so successful). 
223. See Ratner, supra note 68, at 225 (describing the elements of impartiality and 
fairness in the Swiss Banks litigation). EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 164 (explaining that 
“Judge Edward Korman played the Swiss Banks cases like Jascha Heifetz played the violin”). 
224. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 362 (describing the slow dispensation of Swiss 
settlement funds); supra note 148 (providing two examples of subsequent litigation relating to 
In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig.). 
225. See Nuremberg in America, supra note 48, at 91 (discussing the allocation of funds, 
including two percent to attorneys’ fees and two percent towards legal fees out of the US$25 
million settlement); Ratner, supra note 68, at 218 (describing how 550,000 submitted 
questionnaires as an indication that they wanted to be considered part of the class action). 
226. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 362 (describing how slowly funds were dispensed 
following the Swiss Banks litigation); supra note 148 (providing two examples of subsequent 
litigation relating to In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig.). 
227. See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 1 (describing the big personalities of the 
lawyers involved in the Holocaust Restitution Movement, including Charles Moerdler). But 
see Telephone Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner at Stroock, Stroock & Levan (May 
16, 2014) (describing Eizenstat’s personality and the difficulty he had working with Eizenstat 
on behalf of the IKG). 
228. Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing the efficiency and resolution of the Austrian restitution 
claims as a result of the negotiations). EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 358 (discussing Austria’s 
“particularly good record” in making payments). 
229. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(providing the court’s ruling on the Swiss Banks litigation settlement). See EIZENSTAT, supra 
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strategy, it was the combination of the two that created and fostered a 
successful movement around Holocaust litigation.230 
B. The Limitations of Impact Litigation: The Khulumani Case 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank demonstrates the 
importance of looking beyond impact litigation towards multipronged 
strategies.231 In November 2002, the first apartheid-era suit was filed 
in the Eastern District of New York, not long after the first Holocaust 
restitution claim was settled.232 Many of the plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
had litigated in the Holocaust restitution cases, and in particular the 
Swiss Banks litigation, took a leading role in Khulumani as well.233 
Interestingly, Judge Korman, who presided over the Swiss Banks 
litigation, also presided in the Khulumani appeal in the Second 
Circuit.234 The case involved consolidated claims by ninety-one 
named victims claiming arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, 
                                                                                                             
note 1, at 120 (discussing the committee and lawyers working on exposing “the Swiss’ ill-
gotten gains” and fears that certain examinations and reports would not be sufficient). 
230. Furthermore, the early losses sustained by the movement, like Handel and Princz, 
provided clear parameters for how to engage with various mechanisms and allowed the 
movement to reassess their strategies so as to “win through losing.” See generally Douglas 
NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (describing the ways in 
which various movements use their early litigation losses to create successful campaigns 
around their movements later on). But see generally Gerald Rosenberg, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the problems with 
perceived “wins” in litigation and the ways in which those victories can actually be losses). 
231. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 
(2008) (describing the South African apartheid litigation); Michael Thad Allen, The Limits of 
Lex Americana: The Holocaust Restitution Litigation As A Cul-De-Sac of International 
Human-Rights Law, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2011) (discussing the Khulumani litigation 
as an extension of the Holocaust-era litigation tactics). 
232. Allen, supra note 231, at 58. 
233. Michael Hausfeld and Edward Fagan were both involved in the Swiss Banks 
litigation and the Khulumani case. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 
540 (listing the attorneys representing the plaintiffs, including Michael Hausfeld and Edward 
Fagan); see Allen, supra note 231, at 56 (discussing the similarities between the Holocaust 
restitution cases and the Khulumani). 
234. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) aff’d sub 
nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (laying out the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and indicating the panel of judges presiding over the case); Allen, supra note 231, at 
61 (describing Judge Korman’s role in looking into international law, Judge Katzmann’s role 
in looking into international law standards, and Judge Hall’s role in looking into common law 
torts). 
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sexual assault, and other violence.235 The District Court Judge 
dismissed the claims, finding no subject matter jurisdiction on the 
defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.236 On remand, Judge 
Scheindlin dismissed all claims.237 
The Khulumani case developed with many of the same factors as 
the Holocaust restitution litigation: similar attorneys, similar judges, 
and even similar claims.238 The case also shared much of the 
historical scope and complexity of the Holocaust-era claims 
litigation.239 Additionally, the plaintiffs had the support of the US 
Executive, the governments of South Africa, Canada, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Switzerland.240 Yet even with international 
support, impact litigation on its own was not enough without an 
international agreement.241 
                                                                                                             
235. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258 (describing the plaintiff’s claims as “apartheid related” 
claims); Allen, supra note 231, at 57 (discussing the plaintiff’s allegations against fifty named 
multinational corporations “conducting business in apartheid-era South Africa,” as well as 
“hundreds of corporate Does”). 
236. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 259 (“Ruling on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the 
district court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the 
ATCA.”); Allen, supra note 231, at 58-59 (discussing the district court’s dismissal of the case 
on a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for no subject matter jurisdiction). 
237. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding 
that “defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part [and] [p]laintiffs’ 
motion to re-solicit the views of the governments is denied” after six years of litigation); Allen, 
supra note 231, at 62-63 (describing Scheindlin’s analysis of the claims and concluding 
dismissal for insufficient factual detail for some, but that certain allegations could prevail at 
trial on limited grounds). 
238. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258 (outlining the plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges on the 
circuit panel); Allen, supra note 216, at 63 (describing the similarities between the Khulumani 
case and the Holocaust-era litigation, but that in Khulumani, restitution claims were either 
ignored, dismissed, or dropped). 
239. Allen, supra note 231, at 63. 
240. See Allen, supra note 231, at 61-64 (discussing political support for the Khulumani 
case and political disappointment when the court did not take into account the US 
government’s foreign policy interest); Kristen Hutchens, International Law in the American 
Courts - Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.: The Decision Heard “Round the 
Corporate World, 9 GERMAN L.J. 639, 652 (2008) (quoting Thurgood Marshall Jr. as saying 
“[a]t best, the litigation interferes with executive branch leadership in matters of American 
foreign policy”). 
241. See Allen, supra note 231, at 65-67 (describing both the political will for holding 
multinational corporations accountable, and the legal means to do so, and yet barriers to legal 
justice); Hutchens, supra note 240, at 681 (describing the double abuse the victims faced, both 
by the corporate and individual abusers and also by the South African government, who has 
yet to pay reparations). Cf. EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 366 (asserting that “while the 
developments of 2003 have made it increasingly clear that our Holocaust negotiations may 
offer little legal precedent for others to correct broader and more historical injustices through 
US courts, the negotiations do provide lessons on how to address these injustices outside the 
judicial system”). 
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Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme 
Court could not reach a quorum and denied the writ in May 2008.242 
Although impact litigation was unsuccessful in the US courts, other 
processes were still at work within South Africa. For example, in 
1995, the South African Parliament established the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.243 The goal of the Commission 
was to work to heal the wounds created during decades of 
discrimination and racial violence.244 The Commission engaged in 
reconciliation processes and evaluated restitution claims.245 Thus, the 
South African Apartheid restitution process, although not successful 
in the US courts, employed a number of different strategies.246 
C. Application of Movement Building for Other Genocides and Mass 
Human Rights Abuses 
The lessons of the Holocaust Restitution Movement can be 
applied to survivors of other genocides and mass human rights 
abuses.247 The first step is understanding that a successful campaign 
for restitution requires acknowledgement that the campaign must 
function like a movement.248 Inevitably not all strategies will be 
                                                                                                             
242. See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (denying a writ of 
ceriorari); Allen, supra note 231, at 64 (discussing the likelihood of the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari after the number of defendants decreased). 
243. See Hutchens, supra note 240, at 648 (discussing reconciliation processes in place 
within South Africa); Julian Simcock, Unfinished Business: Reconciling the Apartheid 
Reparation Litigation with South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 47 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 339, 246-47 (2011) (discussing the goals of the Commission: (1) to look into human 
rights violations, (2) to work on gathering and evaluating evidence regarding these violations, 
and (3) facilitate granting amnesty). 
244.  See Simcock, supra note 243, at 246-47. (discussing the goals of the Commission: 
(1) to look into human rights violations, (2) to work on gathering and evaluating evidence 
regarding these violations, and (3) facilitate granting amnesty). 
245. See Simcock, supra note 243, at 246-47 (discussing the nature of reparations under 
the Commission and its controversy); Hutchens, supra note 240, at 648 (describing the 
establishment of the Human Rights Violations Committee and the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee for reparations proceedings). 
246. See Simcock, supra note 243, at 254-55 (discussing litigation strategies engaging 
with the Alien Tort Statute); Hutchens, supra note 238, at 651-52 (discussing the controversial 
nature of engaging in litigation outside of South Africa). 
247. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing application to the Cambodian genocide); see infra 
IV.A. (discussing application to the Armenian genocide). 
248. See NeJaime, supra note 230, at 945 (discussing how “litigation loss may, 
counterintuitively, produce winners”); see e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985) (standing as an example of an early Holocaust restitution litigation loss that helped 
shape the trajectory of the movement); Princz v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 
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successful, but learning from losses can be an effective mechanism 
for bringing about long-term legal and social change.249 Next, the 
movement must determine what the survivor community really 
needs.250 This Section will discuss the application of Holocaust 
strategies to two particular genocides as examples of how strategists 
should consider which tools to implement based on community 
needs.251 
1. The Cambodian Genocide: A Welfare-Based Approach 
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, declared a new 
history for Cambodia when they captured Phnom Penh.252 Over the 
next four years, the government instituted a regime of terror.253 The 
Khmer Rouge singled out all minorities, urban groups, and all 
those who had not supported the Khmer during the civil war, also 
called “New People.”254 The “Old People,” mostly those living in 
the countryside in Khmer-controlled regions, were also targeted if 
                                                                                                             
1166 (1993) (providing an example of an early litigation loss that subsequently influenced the 
German slave labor reparations funds). 
249. See NeJaime, supra note 230, at 946 (“[T]he limitation and constraints of court-
centered strategies . . . may function within a dynamic, multifaceted process of law and social 
change.”). But see ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 422 (arguing that the courts do not bring 
about social change or reform, and that there is little evidence that litigation victories produce 
indirect effects that influence reform). 
250. See e.g., supra note 31 (discussing the various welfare programs created in the 
aftermath of World War II to benefit survivors); see e.g., supra note 31 (describing how 
restitution was not as prominent in certain periods but became more prominent in others). 
251. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing application of Holocaust strategies to the 
Cambodian genocide); infra Part IV.A. (discussing application of Holocaust strategies to the 
Armenian genocide). 
252. The Khmer Rouge, also known as the Communist Party of Kampuchia, was 
founded in 1968 and seized power in 1975. See Ben Kiernan, The Cambodian Genocide—
1975-1979, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 339, 
339-374 (Samuel Totten et al. eds., 2004) (discussing Pol Pot’s rise and the start of his 
regime); Theresea Klosterman, The Feasability and Propriety of a Truth Commission in 
Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 833, 845 (1998) (discussing 
the Khmer Rogue’s brutal rise to power). 
253. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 339 (describing how between 1975 and 1979, 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was a prison camp State, with 8 million prisoners spending their 
time in solitary confinement); Klosterman, supra note 252, at 845 (discussing the rise of Pol 
Pot’s totalitarian State beginning with resistance from the jungle and eventually ascention to 
power in 1975). 
254. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 339-74 (discussing the various groups targeted by 
the Khmer Rogue including Buddhists, dissenters, and Chinese); Klosterman, supra note 252, 
at 848 (describing the victims of the genocide as cultural and religious minorities, including 
Chams, Chinese, Thai, and Vietnamese). 
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the Khmer perceived them as traitors.255 Between one-and-a-half to 
two million people were murdered during those four years.256 The 
genocide ended when the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and 
removed the Khmer Rouge from power in 1978.257 In 1997, the 
United Nations organized elections within the country that resulted in 
a hybrid government.258 After a bloody coup, Hun Sen overthrew his 
co-prime minister and won new elections in 1998.259 From 1975 well 
into the 1990s, the country was politically and economically 
unstable.260 The country was wrought by civil war, unrest, and 
terror.261 
In 2003, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia 
(“ECCC”) was established through an agreement between the 
international community and Cambodia.262 The goal was to try the 
                                                                                                             
255. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 347 (describing how DK initially divided the 
country into “New People” and “Old People,” but with dissent, the lines were blurred); 
Klosterman, supra note 252, at 849 (acknowledging that the purges did not stop with 
minorities, but that four out of five of those slaughtered were Khmer Rogue personnel). 
256. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 348 (providing a table with statistics of the number 
murdered from each targeted group, totaling 1.6 million); Klosterman, supra note 252, at 849-
50 (asserting that estimates of the total number killed under the Khmer Rogue is between 1.7 
and 2 million). 
257. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 348 (discussing the US bombing of Cambodia and 
Vietnamese invasion); Klosterman, supra note 252, at 849 (discussing the victory of 
Vietnamese over the Khmer Rogue). 
258. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 353 (discussing the eventual surrender of all Khmer 
Rogue personnel and establishment of elections); Klosterman, supra note 252, at 862 
(discussing the Cambodian elections as forthcoming in July 1998). 
259. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 353 (describing the fall of the last of the Khmer 
Rogue outposts including the December 1998 surrender of the top surviving Khmer Rogue 
leaders); Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation:  
The Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International Criminal Justice, 20 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 247, 252 (2010) (discussing the eventual withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the 
signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 1991). 
260. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 350-53 (discussing the continued struggles to 
eliminate Khmer Rouge pockets in the Cambodian jungles); Klosterman, supra note 252, at 
853-54 (describing how Pol Pot’s own troops eventually seized him and tried him in a 
“People’s Trial”). 
261. See Kiernan, supra note 252, at 353 (describing pockets of unrest in the northern 
Camobidan jungles); Jain, supra note 259, at 261 (discussing the Prime Minister’s threat to 
plunge the country back into civil war during peace negotiations). 
262. See Renee Jeffrey, Beyond Repair?: Collective and Moral Reparations at the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 103, 113 (2014) (discussing how one of the provisions 
brought by victims to the ECCC was for “social services, support for agriculture and 
‘justice’”); Susan Dicklitch and Aditi Malik, Justice, Human Rights, and Reconciliation in 
Postconflict Cambodia, 11 HUM. RTS. REV. 515, 523 (2010) (asserting that a culture that 
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perpetrators of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.263 
The ECCC was devoted to criminal proceedings as well as 
reparations.264 According to Scholar Renee Jeffrey, “reparations seek 
to repair damage or harm that has been unjustly inflicted on an 
individual, group or state. At their ideal extreme they are a form of 
restitution.”265 The ECCC established a provision in order to allow 
victims to participate “in the criminal proceedings as civil parties.”266 
According to the Internal Rules of the ECCC, victims had the 
capacity to “seek collective and moral reparations.”267 However, the 
court made no effort to define what collective and moral meant, and 
reparations were not awarded in any of the ECCC cases.268 
Scholars have asserted that the ECCC was unsuccessful not only 
because of rampant corruption, but also because the court did not 
address the needs of the Cambodian survivors, namely to establish 
social welfare programs.269 According to Scholar Renee Jeffrey, one 
                                                                                                             
secures “both civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights (as 
outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)” is necessary); Kristen Ainley,  
Transitional Justice in Cambodia:  The Coincidence of Power and Principle, in  
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 125, 127 (Renee Jeffrey & Hun Joon Kim eds., 
2013) (discussing the formation of the ECCC through international agreement in 2003). 
263. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 103 (discussing the crimes charged at the ECCC); 
Ainley, supra note 262, at 127 (describing the goal of the ECCC as to “try ‘senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom and 
international conventions recognized in Cambodia’”). 
264. See Ainley, supra note 263, at 128 (describing the ECCC as having both restorative 
and retributive justice elements); Jeffrey, supra note 263, at 108 (discussing the interplay 
between reparations and retributive justice). 
265. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 104 (describing the reparations component at the 
ECCC but that assessment of moral reparations was difficult); Ainley, supra note 262, at 141 
(asserting that there is no provision for providing individual restitution, only for “moral” 
restitution). 
266. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 107. 
267. Internal Rules, (Rev. 8) of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
2011. 23[1][a]&[b] (providing the general principles of victims’ participation as civil parties); 
see Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 104 (discussing the ability of victims to appear at trial 
proceedings and engage in those proceedings). 
268. See Ainley, supra note 262, at 141 (discussing one of the problems with the ECCC 
as its reluctance to award reparations); Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 104 (asserting that the 
ECCC fell short of its initial expectations with regards to reparations). 
269. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 112 (discussing how the court disregarded a petition 
brought by victims for welfare-based initiatives); Dicklitch & Malik, supra note 262, at 518 
(asserting the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights). 
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of the provisions brought by victims to the ECCC was for “social 
services, support for agriculture and ‘justice,’ vaguely define[d].”270 
Cambodians wanted to return to a world of relative normalcy, to 
begin working again, and to be given the tools to begin rebuilding 
their society.271 Surveys conducted during the ECCC found that 
priorities from Cambodian citizens were socioeconomic, rather than 
related to justice in terms of prosecution and punishment.272 A 
restitution strategy focused on the needs of the community would be 
most responsive and successful long-term.273 
Holocaust restitution processes began long before the litigation 
battles and negotiations of the 1990s.274 Those programs focused on 
providing welfare for survivors.275 Additionally, provisions in both 
Austria’s GSF and the Swiss Banks settlement provided 
compensation for elderly survivors in need in Israel and Eastern 
Europe.276 The survivors of the Cambodian genocide require similar 
                                                                                                             
270.  Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 113 (discussing how survivors of the Cambodian 
genocide wanted welfare-based support rather than criminal proceedings); see Dicklitch & 
Malik, supra note 262, at 519 (explaining that “[t]he Khmer concept of justice is rooted more 
firmly in traditional, moral practices of mutual understanding and agreement than in state laws 
or legal practices” and that “a more restorative approach to justice seems to emanate from 
Khmer history”). 
271.  See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 109 (describing survey results from 2008 and 2010 
that called for greater tools to rebuild the Cambodian society); Dicklitch & Malik, supra note 
262, at 519 (explaining that “[t]he most extreme form of punishment within the E.C.C.C. 
involves incarceration,” and that “[g]iven the impoverished living conditions for most 
Cambodians, this punishment would hardly rebalance the ‘dharma’ for perpetrators of mass 
injustice”). 
272.  See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 109 (describing surveys collected from Cambodians 
requesting greater socioeconomic support rather than prosecution of criminals); Dicklitch & 
Malik, supra note 262, at 521 (noting that not only was the court behind schedule but, since its 
mandate allowed for the trial of major Khmer officials only, it was not able to bring the 
majority of perpetrators to justice). 
273.  See MARRUS, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing early welfare programs for Holocaust 
restitution); HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, SOCIAL WELFARE FOR JEWISH NAZI 
VICTIMS, I. 22-32 (Prague, June 2009) (describing various welfare programs from the 1950s 
and 60s). 
274. See supra Part I.A. (discussing Holocaust restitution programs prior to the 1990s). 
275. See supra note 27 (discussing the Restitution from Western Allied Zones Program); 
supra note 31 (describing the BEG restitution program). 
276. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143-44 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (discussing the settlement provisions, and providing compensation for survivors who fit 
within one of the settlement classes, even if they have never lived in Switzerland or the United 
States); GSF Agreement, supra note 171, at 570 (Annex A) (discussing immediate 
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programs.277 In fact, survivors demanded such programs at the 
ECCC.278 Although the ECCC, like the Nuremberg Trials before 
them, focused on retributive justice, unlike the progression of 
Holocaust restitution after 1945, there has been little attention given 
to the demands of survivors who have pushed for the improvement of 
their basic living.279 Therefore, the focus of the Cambodian restitution 
movement should be on welfare-based programs within Cambodia to 
bolster survivors’ socioeconomic status.280 
2. The Armenian Genocide: Fighting for Restitution One Hundred 
Years Later 
In 1915, the Young Turk government, a reformist movement 
against the former Turkish absolutist sultan Abdul-Hamid, shifted its 
policy towards the Armenian population within Turkey from 
oppression to deportation and premeditated extermination amounting 
to genocide.281 On April 24, 1915, 235 Armenian doctors, clergy, 
                                                                                                             
compensation to survivors, regardless of where they live today so long as they originate from 
or are living in Austria). 
277. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 113 (discussing the tension between what the civil 
parties requested, reparations in the form of socioeconomic measure, and what they received, 
memorials and apologies); Ainley, supra note 262, at 140 (discussing the trial court’s lack of 
imagination as providing reparations). 
278. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 110-11. 
279. The Nuremberg Trials of 1945 tried various high-ranking Nazi officials in front of a 
tribunal of judges from the Unites States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. The crimes 
charged included crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The trials 
focused on retributive justice. See generally Lawrence Douglas, The Didactic Trial: Filtering 
History and Memory into the Courtroom, 14 EUROPEAN REV. 513 (2006) (discussing the 
innovations of the Nuremberg trials, including the “notion that perpetrators could be made to 
answer for their conduct before international courts”); Leora Bilsky, Transnational Holocaust 
Litigation, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 349 (2012) (describing how publicized the Nuremberg trials 
were). 
280. See Jeffrey, supra note 263, at 113 (discussing the request for socioeconomic 
programs as restitution from the ECCC); Ainley, supra note 263, at 141 (describing the lack of 
focus on restitution at the ECCC). 
281. Prior to 1915, the Turkish government systematically discriminated against the 
Armenian minority population. There were numerous pogroms against the Armenian 
populations in the 1890s, however, none reached the scale or scope of the genocide. The 
Young Turks initially promised reform but quickly shifted to xenophobic policies once in 
power. See DANIEL BLOXHAM, THE GREAT GAME OF GENOCIDE: IMPERIALISM, 
NATIONALISM, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN ARMENIANS 70 (2005) (discussing 
context of the Armenian genocide as originally a means of promoting an ethnic war outside 
Turkey); Jeffrey W. Stempel et. al., Stoney Road Out of Eden: The Struggle to Recover 
Insurance for Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its Implications for the Future of State 
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lawyers, politicians, and teachers were arrested and murdered in 
Constantinople, leaving the Armenian community leaderless and 
vulnerable.282 The Turkish government began transferring Armenian 
soldiers from the Turkish army into labor battalions where they were 
either killed or worked to death.283 Between late May and early June 
1915, Armenians were deported from Turkey into the desert where 
they were intended to die from starvation, dehydration, and heat.284 
Non-Armenian populations were exempt from the deportations.285 
Approximately 1.5 million people were deported over the course of 
eight months.286 As the convoys traveled into the desert, men aged 
fifteen and older were taken aside and stabbed with daggers or shot; 
many women were kidnapped, forced to convert to Islam, and taken 
as sex slaves.287 Many children were kidnapped and converted so as 
to destroy and eliminate the Armenians as a group.288 One-half to 
                                                                                                             
Authority, Contract Rights, and Human Rights, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012) 
(discussing the growing discrimination policies against the Armenian community in Turkey); 
Saroyan, supra note 21, at 290-91  (discussing the situation in Turkey for Armenians prior to 
1915). 
282. See Robert F. Melson, The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of 
Twentieth-Century Genocide, in THE GENOCIDE STUDIES READER 234, 235 (Samuel Totten & 
Paul R. Bartrop eds., 2009) (describing the progression of anti-Armenian policy in Turkey 
from targeting elites to full-scale genocide); Stempel et al. supra note 281, at 26 (discussing 
the arrest and murder of Armenian leaders in Turkey’s capital). 
283. See Melson, supra note 282, at 235 (discussing the shift in Turkish ideology and the 
start of the Armenian genocide); Bloxham, supra note 281, at 69-70 (analyzing the Armenian 
genocide as ethnic cleansing and providing background on Turkish actions leading up to the 
genocide). 
284. See Bloxham, supra note 281, at 69 (describing the “Armenian fate” as “composed 
of two elements: ethnic cleansing, or forced collective displacement, and direct physical 
annihilation); Melson, supra note 283, at 235 (describing the progression from targeting 
Armenian men within the Turkish army to targeting Armenian civilians); Stempel et al., supra 
note 281, at 26-27 (describing the mass deportations of the Armenian community). 
285.  Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 26. 
286. See Bloxham, supra note 281, at 81 (discussing the first deportations from Zeytun, 
which began in 1915 as incremental deportations and turned into a flood); Melson, supra note 
282, at 235 (discussing the mass deportations instituted by the Turkish government). 
287. See Bloxham, supra note 281, at 83 (discussing the early deportations as a regional 
policy rather than national and that deportations conditions varied across groups); Melson, 
supra note 283, at 235 (discussing the horrendous treatment of the Armenian civilian 
population). 
288. See Bloxham, supra note 281, at 90 (discussing that as of June 1915, Talat 
authorized killing escapees or resisters in deportation columns and that deportees were not 
intended to return); Melson, supra note 282, at 235 (discussing the specific atrocities 
Armenian children faced); Saroyan, supra note 281, at 292-93 (describing the Armenian 
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three-quarters of the Armenian population living in the Ottoman 
Empire were murdered between 1915 and 1923.289 
While all these atrocities were occurring in Turkey, the United 
States, Great Britain, and France were in the midst of World War I 
fighting against Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 
Turkey.290 At the close of World War I in August 1920, the Allies sat 
down with Turkey to draft the Treaty of Sevres.291 The Treaty 
memorialized a number of concessions including Turkey’s 
recognition of an independent Armenia, its obligation to assist 
survivors through repatriation, restoration, and the rescue of women 
and children held in Muslim households, and its commitment to 
prosecuting the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide.292 The Treaty 
was annulled fourteen days later and Turkish forces attacked the 
Armenians and annexed nearly all Armenian land within a matter of 
months.293 
Efforts were made after the Armenian genocide, similar to those 
made after the Holocaust, to prosecute perpetrators of the genocide.294 
Great Britain urged for a Turkish military court to try the Young Turk 
leaders for their role in perpetrating the Armenian genocide.295 This 
                                                                                                             
genocide as a “massive and systematic operation against Amenians throughout almost all of 
the empire”). 
289. See Bloxham, supra note 281, at 70-71 (discussing how the genocide did not 
originate as a calculated policy of murder, but progressed to murdering millions); Melson, 
supra note 283, at 235-36 (describing the number of Armenians murdered during the 
genocide). 
290. See Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 21 (discussing the rise of the Young Turks in 
the Ottoman Empire and the start of World War I); Saroyan, supra note 21, at 293 (discussing 
the victory of the Allies in World War I over the Turks). 
291. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 293 (discussing the aftermath of WWI); Stempel et 
al., supra note 281, at 33 (describing the Treaty of Sevres). 
292. See Saroyan, supra note 281, at 293-94 (describing the concession Turkey made in 
the draft of the Treaty of Sevres); Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 34 (discussing the 
requirements the Turkish government had by signing the treaty). 
293. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 294 (discussing the Turkish offensive when the 
Treaty of Sevres failed); Stempel et al., supra note 282, at 34 (describing the failures of the 
Treaty of Sevres). 
294. See supra note 278 (discussing the Nuremberg Trials); supra note 291 (discussing 
efforts in the Treaty of Sevres to include provisions for an International Tribunal). 
295. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 285, 294 (discussing the British plan for prosecution 
of the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide); Stempel, et al., supra note 281, at 34-35 (2012) 
(discussing the Treaty of Luasanne, subsequent to the Treaty of Sevres, which focused on 
economic relations between Turkey and Europe but took discussion of the Armenian genocide 
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initiative became known as “the Nuremberg that failed” because none 
of the judgments were enforced.296 Additionally, like survivors of the 
Holocaust, most of the survivors of the Armenian genocide lived in 
diaspora communities.297 A large portion of that community moved to 
the United States, generations after the genocide pushed for 
recognition of the Armenian genocide by the US government.298 That 
community also began talking about what happened only years after 
the event.299 Like Holocaust survivors, many survivors of the 
Armenian genocide wanted to put the event behind them and rebuild 
their lives.300 Thus, recognition even within the community only 
began years later.301 
Twelve elderly Armenians brought the first Armenian genocide 
lawsuit in 2000 regarding insurance claims against a US company, 
                                                                                                             
off the table); Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the Un Genocide 
Convention Include A Provision on Cultural Genocide, or Should the Phenomenon Be 
Encompassed in A Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 122-23 (2009) 
(discussing the failure of the Treaty of Lausanne, which abandoned the plan for an 
international tribunal to prosecute the Ottoman Turks for the Armenian genocide). 
296. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 294 (2011) (describing how the failed initiative led 
to Armenian forces assassinating Young Turk leaders throughout Europe of their own accord); 
Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide Convention 
Include A Provision on Cultural Genocide, or Should the Phenomenon Be Encompassed in A 
Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 122-23 (2009) (noting the failure to 
include provision to try the Turks for the Armenian genocide). 
297. See NOVICK, supra note 6, at 79 (discussing the proportions of Holocaust survivors 
living in the United States and Israel); Stempel, et al., supra note 281, at 37 (2012) (discussing 
the large Armenian diaspora community living in the United States). 
298. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 39 (2012) (discussing how subsequent to the 50th 
commemoration of the Armenian genocide, survivors and their offspring sparked a political 
movement where Congressmen made speeches commemorating the anniversary of the 
genocide); see generally NOVICK, supra note 6, at 209 (discussing the sources that pushed for 
Holocaust memory commemoration from the 1970s through the 1990s, including the famous 
miniseries Holocaust). 
299. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 38 (2012) (discussing the rise of a new generation 
focused on civil rights and anti-Vietnam War protests that sought historical justice); see 
NOVICK , supra note 6, at 207 (discussing how the Holocaust began to “loom so large” in the 
United States’ consciousness in the 1990s). 
300. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 39 (2012) (discussing the April 24, 1965 
commemoration of the Armenian genocide as a turning point for talking about and 
memorializing the genocide); see generally NOVICK, supra note 6 (discussing the shift in 
Holocaust memory in the United States from silence in the postwar period to public 
commemoration in the 1990s). 
301. See NOVICK , supra note 6, at 84 (describing the United States’ and Israel’s goal of 
integrating survivors into society so as to relegate “the Holocaust to history”); Stempel et al., 
supra note 281, at 36-37 (2012) (describing how survivors sought to build a new life for 
themselves in the United States after the Armenian genocide). 
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New York Life Insurance.302 The suit was filed as a class action in 
Marootian v. New York Life Ins. Co., similar to the Holocaust 
restitution class actions, and sought the payment of policies by New 
York Life.303 Although New York Life found policy cards in their 
archives and did not dispute the insurance policies themselves, it 
argued that the policies contained forum selection clauses for dispute 
resolution in French or English courts.304 New York Life also argued 
that the suit was time-barred since the policies were written and 
allegedly unpaid almost a century prior.305 In response, the California 
legislature enacted a statute similar to one it passed in response to 
Holocaust-era insurance and slave labor litigation, using the 
Holocaust Restitution Movement as a model for actions relating to the 
Armenian genocide.306 The case settled in May 2001, although 
negotiations for the specific settlement amount were not finalized 
until January 2004.307 The parties settled for US$20 million, with 
US$11 million set aside for potential claims by the heirs of 2,400 
policyholders, US$3 million distributed to nine Armenian charitable 
organizations, and US$6 million allocated for attorneys’ fees and 
administrative costs.308 Similar to Holocaust restitution cases before 
it, the amount individual policyholders received was quite small.309 
For survivors of the Armenian genocide, the focal point of the 
movement must be different from that of the Cambodian genocide for 
                                                                                                             
302. See Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing the insurance lawsuit 
brought against New York Life Insurance Company); Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 46 
(describing the lawsuit brought by survivors in 2000 against New York Life Insurance). 
303. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 46.  
304. See Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 33 (describing the defendant’s 
motions to dismiss); Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 46-47 (describing procedural issues like 
the defendant’s 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss). 
305. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 47.  
306. See Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 33-34 (discussing the California 
legislature’s statute allowing courts to hear Armenian genocide-era policy claims despite 
forum selection clauses and time limitations); Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 49 (describing 
California Senate Bill 1915, which extended the statutory limitations for Armenian genocide-
era insurance claims). 
307. See Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 34 (discussing the settlement 
between plaintiffs and New York Life); Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 54 (discussing the 
final settlement agreement between plaintiffs and New York Life). 
308. Stempel et al., supra note 281, at 54. 
309. Id. Each individual policyholder would get approximately US$4,583.33 based on 
the estimate of 2,400 policyholders. 
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historical and social reasons.310 According to Scholar Alfred de 
Zayas, “[b]earing in mind that there is no prescription in international 
law in cases of Genocide and crimes against humanity, the Armenian 
entitlement for reparation has certainly not lapsed.”311 He argues that 
the Armenians should continue to demand “reparations in the form of 
restitution of their cultural and religious heritage,” because although 
the genocide occurred in 1915, its consequences still reverberate 
today.312 De Zayas claims that in order to create a change in the 
process of Armenian restitution, “political will” must materialize.313 
Only with the creation of a political and financial pressure will there 
be any change for Armenian restitution.314 As a result, the focus of the 
movement should be on engaging media and pursuing high power 
litigation in the United States to draw attention to the genocide.315 
This would allow for a resurgence of memory in the United States and 
potentially push the US government to engage the Turkish 
government in acknowledging the historical injustice even though a 
century has passed since the event.316 
                                                                                                             
310. Michael J. Bazyler The Post-Holocaust Restitution Era: Holocaust Restitution as a 
Model for Addressing Other Historical Injustices, Working Paper no. 2-03, at 14 (2003); de 
Zayas, supra note 120, at 1 (discussing the status of Armenian restitution today). 
311. See de Zayas, supra note 120, at 1 (discussing the importance of restitution 
regardless of the time that has elapsed since the genocide); see Comparative Perspective, 
supra note 21, at 33 (describing a suit brought in 2000 by twelve elderly Armenians against the 
New York Life Insurance Company).  
312. See de Zayas, supra note 120, at 1 (discussing the application of restitution 
regardless of the time that has elapsed since the genocide); see Comparative Perspective, 
supra note 21, at 33 (describing a suit brought in 2000 by twelve elderly Armenians against the 
New York Life Insurance Company). 
313. See de Zayas, supra note 119, at 1 (discussing the application of restitution 
regardless of the time that has elapsed since the genocide); see Comparative Perspective, 
supra note 92, at 33 (describing a suit brought in 2000 by twelve elderly Armenians against the 
New York Life Insurance Company). 
314. Vartges Saroyan calls for a process similar to that of the restitution for Holocaust 
survivors. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 298 (2011) (discussing political barriers to Armenian 
restitution, namely that the Turkish government continues to call the event “unfortunate 
wartime killings” rather than a genocide); de Zayas, supra note 120, at 1 (calling on the 
Turkish government to recognize the event as a genocide and formally apologize). 
315. See Comparative Perspective, supra note 21, at 34 (describing the importance of 
movement building and creating momentum through impact litigation like Holocaust 
restitution claims). But see Saroyan, supra note 21, at 287 (analyzing momentum building 
through the lens of ADR principles like assessing a party’s reservation price and best-
alternative-to-a-negotiated-agreement (BATNA)). 
316. Vartges Saroyan calls for a process similar to that of the restitution for Holocaust 
survivors. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 287 (discussing the disparity between the Holocaust 
Restitution Movement and the lack of momentum for the Armenian genocide); Comparative 
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CONCLUSION: CREATING MOMENTUM FOR FUTURE 
STRATEGIES 
Holocaust restitution claims facilitated the creation of a 
successful movement.317 Plaintiffs’ attorneys learned from their early 
mistakes and built continued pressure through both litigation and 
political negotiations.318 The men and women involved in the process, 
whether they were looking for a large class action payout, world-wide 
recognition, or were merely interested in pursuing a measure of 
justice, worked to create a framework through which Holocaust 
survivors could find peace.319 Although the payments from 
settlements themselves were not particularly large, the attention 
created by the litigation and political negotiations through the vast 
media attention spread Holocaust memory and consciousness.320 
Just like the Holocaust Restitution Movement employed a 
variety of strategies, so too must any subsequent restitution 
movement.321 Maria Altmann, when pursuing the return of her 
                                                                                                             
Perspective, supra note 21, at 34 (discussing the success of an Armenian insurance claim suit 
that implemented similar strategies to the Holocaust Restitution Movement). 
317. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the successes and failures of the class action and 
negotiation strategies); GSF Agreement, supra note 171 (providing an example of a 
negotiation that led to a successful agreement between Austria and the United States); In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (providing an 
example of a class action litigation that successfully yielded a settlement). 
318. See generally NeJaime, supra note 230, at 941 (discussing instances where early 
litigation loss can create long term success through restructuring strategies). But see 
ROSENBERG, supra note 230, at 422 (discussing the problems with perceived “wins” in 
litigation and the ways in which those victories can actually be losses). 
319. See Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, Attorney, Simon Wiesenthal Center, in New 
York, NY (Mar. 17, 2014) (providing the perspective of one litigator on the Holocaust 
Restitution Movement and his involvement in order to right historical wrongs); Telephone 
Interview with Charles Moerdler, Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Levan (May 16, 2014) 
(discussing his involvement not only as a litigator but also as a Holocaust survivor speaking 
for and supporting other survivors); see generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 1 (explaining why 
Eizenstat became involved in Holocaust restitution negotiations, how he became involved, and 
the immense value he gained through his involvement). 
320. See HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the media storm 
surrounding the Swiss bank litigation); Edgar Bronfman & Israel Singer, Foreword in THE 
PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST at viii (Avi Beker ed., 2001) 
(illustrating the World Jewish Congress’s role in the resurgence of Holocaust-era memory and 
the role of the media in creating interest in the resurgence). 
321. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(providing the procedure and progression of the Altmann case as it passed through federal 
district court and eventually made it up to the Supreme Court to rule on the Foreign Sovereigns 
Immunity Act); see Wissbroecker, supra note 4, at 54-62 (discussing Altmann’s use of 
litigation and negotiations as tools). But see Allen, supra note 231, at 63 (discussing the 
failures of the Holocaust restitution strategies in a subsequent case). 
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family’s property, tried negotiations, working within Austria’s legal 
structure, and finally used the US legal system to her advantage.322 
Her attempts demonstrate how important it is to not only implement a 
multipronged strategy but also to learn from early mistakes.323 
Survivors of other mass human rights abuses can use the lessons 
of the Holocaust Restitution Movement.324 Survivors can bring claims 
not only in the United States, which provides an interesting and 
nuanced system for engaging with class action and political 
diplomacy, but also in the international arena.325 Khulumani 
demonstrates how sometimes class action litigation with political 
support might not be enough for resolution.326 Understanding these 
mechanisms and structuring a mass movement around them will 
enable restitution processes to progress on many levels and lead to 
successful outcomes.327 
This Note provides a number of tools available to future 
strategists working on restitution.328 The ILC Principles, although not 
implemented by the Holocaust Restitution Movement, could be 
pursued as an interesting and innovative approach for claiming 
restitution at an international level.329 Additionally, although impact 
                                                                                                             
322. See supra Introduction (describing Maria Altmann’s process in pursuing the 
restitution of her looted property). 
323. See supra Parts I and II (describing the two effects tools used by those pursuing 
Holocaust restitution: class action litigation and looted art). 
324. See supra Part III.C. (discussing application of Holocaust restitution strategies to the 
Cambodian and Armenian contexts). 
325. See supra Part II.C. (describing the potential application of international legal 
principles to individual restitution claims). 
326. See Buyse, supra note 208, at 135 (arguing that application of the ILC Principles 
from state-based restitution to individual restitution at an international level is possible). See 
generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (inquiring as to the ability to extend international principles 
of restitution to individual cases). 
327. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 113 (discussing the need for a welfare based 
approach after the conclusion of the ECCC). Vartges Saroyan calls for a process similar to that 
of the restitution for Holocaust survivors. See Saroyan, supra note 21, at 287 (discussing the 
importance of implementing similar strategies from the Holocaust Restitution Movement to 
the Armenian genocide restitution movement).  
328. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing ways of implementing Holocaust restitution 
strategies in two specific cases). 
329.  See Buyse, supra note 208, at 135 (arguing that “This argument starts with three 
basic assumptions. The first is the general principle that every violation of a substantive rule of 
international law requires a remedy. The second is that states are under a general obligation to 
respect and ensure human rights. The third is that individuals, as stated in the previous 
paragraph, are the main beneficiaries towards which the duty of human rights observance is 
owed. If one accepts these three assumptions, there can be no other logical conclusion than the 
following: individuals should have a right to reparation applying the ILC Articles by 
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litigation has been successful in the Holocaust Restitution Movement, 
there have also been instances where litigation alone could not be the 
answer.330 Khulumani is merely one example where impact litigation 
alone was not sufficient to pursue restitution for the crimes committed 
during Apartheid.331 The most important step for creating momentum 
and building a movement is determining the needs of the 
community.332 For the survivors of the Cambodian genocide that 
meant welfare-based programs, but for the descendants of the 
Armenian genocide, recognition of a historical wrong and creating 
stronger memory and consciousness of the event may be a more 
appropriate strategy.333 Each case is unique and nuanced, as 
evidenced by the specific historical, political, and social 
considerations needed to assess the communities’ needs.334 Although 
                                                                                                             
analogy”). See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (discussing “whether the sum of the international 
rights of the Organization comprises the right to bring an international claim to obtain 
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330.  See Allen, supra note 231, at 63 (describing both the political will for holding 
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for waiving any claims against a post-Saddam government.” See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 
366 (envisioning the application of the commissions set up to compensate victims of Nazism 
and the subsequent legal peace created from the international agreements). 
331. Hutchens, supra note 240, at 686. 
332. See supra Part IV.C. (describing the differences between the needs of the survivors 
of the Armenian and Cambodian genocides and how those needs should inform restitution 
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333. See Jeffrey, supra note 262, at 113 (discussing how survivors of the Cambodian 
genocide wanted welfare based support rather than criminal proceedings); Dicklitch et. al, 
supra note 262, at 519 (explaining that “[t]he Khmer concept of justice is rooted more firmly 
in traditional, moral practices of mutual understanding and agreement than in state laws or 
legal practices. Hence, a more restorative approach to justice seems to emanate from Khmer 
history.”). See de Zayas, supra note 120, at 1 (discussing the application of restitution 
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there can never be full justice for such egregious violations and 
horrific trauma, the strategies illustrated herein can provide a 
semblance of imperfect justice, but justice nonetheless.335 
 
                                                                                                             
335. See supra Part IV (discussing the application of Holocaust strategies to groups 
seeking restitution subsequently). See supra Part III (discussing the success of the international 
negotiations in yielding two agreements with Austria concerning Holocaust-era claims); Part II 
(discussing the success of the Swiss Banks and Austrian Bank cases in providing 
compensation and media attention to Holocaust related claims). 
